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Abstract
Private computation in a distributed storage system (DSS) is a generalization of the private information retrieval
(PIR) problem. In such setting a user wishes to compute a function of f messages stored in noncolluding coded
databases while revealing no information about the desired function to the databases. We consider the problem of
private polynomial computation (PPC). In PPC, a user wishes to compute a multivariate polynomial of degree at
most g over f variables (or messages) stored in multiple databases. First, we consider the private computation of
polynomials of degree g = 1, i.e., private linear computation (PLC) for coded databases. In PLC, a user wishes to
compute a linear combination over the f messages while keeping the coefficients of the desired linear combination
hidden from the database. For a linearly encoded DSS, we present a capacity-achieving PLC scheme and show
that the PLC capacity, which is the ratio of the desired amount of information and the total amount of downloaded
information, matches the maximum distance separable coded capacity of PIR for a large class of linear storage
codes. Then, we consider private computation of higher degree polynomials, i.e., g > 1. For this setup, we construct
two novel PPC schemes. In the first scheme we consider Reed-Solomon coded databases with Lagrange encoding,
which leverages ideas from recently proposed star-product PIR and Lagrange coded computation. The second scheme
considers the special case of coded databases with systematic Lagrange encoding. Both schemes yield improved
rates compared to the best known schemes from the literature for a small number of messages, while asymptotically,
as f →∞, the systematic scheme gives a significantly better computation rate compared to all known schemes up
to some storage code rate that depends on the maximum degree of the candidate polynomials.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of private information retrieval (PIR) from public databases, introduced by Chor et al. [3], has been
the focus of attention for several decades in the computer science community (see, e.g., [4]–[6]). The goal of PIR
is to allow a user to privately access an arbitrary message stored in a set of databases, i.e., without revealing any
information of the identity of the requested message to each database. If the users do not have any side information
on the data stored in the databases, the best strategy is to store the messages in at least two databases while ensuring
PIR. Hence, the design of PIR protocols has focused on the case when multiple databases store the messages. This
connects to the active and renowned research area of distributed storage systems (DSSs), where the data is encoded
by an [n, k] linear code and then distributed and stored across n storage nodes [7], usually referred to as coded
DSSs. Using coding techniques, coded DSSs possess many practical features and benefits such as high reliability,
efficient repairability, robustness, and security [8]. Recently, the aspect of minimizing the communication cost, e.g.,
the required rate or bandwidth of privately querying the databases with the desired requests and downloading the
corresponding information from the databases has attracted a great deal of attention in the information theory and
coding communities. Thus, the renewed interest in PIR primarily focused on the study and design of efficient PIR
protocols for coded DSSs (see, e.g., [9]–[16]).
A recently proposed generalization of the PIR problem [17]–[22] addresses the private computation (PC) for
functions of the stored messages, also denoted as private function retrieval. In PC a user has access to a given
number of databases and intends to compute a function of messages stored in these databases. This function is kept
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2Fig. 1: Simple overview of PIR problem extensions and variations.
private from the databases, as they may be under the control of an adversary. In [17], [18], the scenario of private
linear functions computation is considered for noncolluding replicated databases. In these works, the capacity and
achievable rates for the communication overhead needed to privately compute a given linear function, called private
linear computation (PLC), were derived as a function of the number of messages and the number of databases,
respectively. Interestingly, the obtained PLC capacity is equal to the PIR capacity of [11]. The extension to the
coded case is addressed in [20]–[22]. In particular, in [20] we proposed a PLC scheme based on maximum distance
separable (MDS) coded storage. The presented scheme is able to achieve the MDS-coded PIR capacity established
in [13], referred to as the MDS-PIR capacity in the sequel. In [21], private polynomial computation (PPC) over t
colluding and systematically coded databases is considered by generalizing the star-product PIR scheme of [15].
In that work, the functions to be computed are polynomials of degree at most g, and a PC rate equal to the
best asymptotic PIR rate of MDS-coded storage (when the number of messages tends to infinity) is achieved for
g = t = 1 (the case of linear function retrieval and noncolluding databases). An alternative PPC approach was
recently proposed in [22] for polynomials with higher degree, i.e., g > 1, by employing Reed-Solomon (RS) coded
databases with Lagrange encoding. For low code rates, the scheme improves on the PC rate of [21]. Finally, a
separate but relevant form of PC, the private search (PS) problem [19] considers mapping records replicated over
n noncolluding databases to binary search patterns. Each pattern represents the search result of one value out of a
set of candidate alphabets. The asymptotic capacity, i.e., information retrieval rate for PS with large alphabet size,
of privately retrieving one search pattern is found to match the asymptotic capacity of PIR for the special case of
balanced PS. In a balanced PS scenario, the nonlinearly dependent search patterns are assumed to contain equal
amount of information. An overview of how these extensions align together can be seen in Fig. 1.
In another line of research, for the case of noncolluding databases, two PIR protocols for a DSS where data
is stored using a non-MDS linear code, are proposed in [16], and their protocols are shown to achieve both the
asymptotic and the nonasymptotic MDS-PIR capacity for a large class of linear codes. The first family of non-MDS
codes for which the PIR capacity is known is found in [23], [24]. Further, PIR on linearly-coded databases for
the case of colluding databases is also addressed in [14]–[16], [25]. For the PC case with noncolluding databases,
however, capacity results for arbitrary linearly-coded DSSs have not been addressed so far in the open literature to
the best of our knowledge.
In this work, we intend to fill this void by proposing three PC schemes and deriving an outer bound on the PC
rate over all possible PC protocols. Our contributions are outlined as follow.
• For the capacity of PPC, we adapt the converse proof of [24, Thm. 4] to the coded PPC problem and derive
an outer bound on the PPC rate (see Theorem 2). From this outer bound, as a special case of PPC when
g = 1, we prove a converse bound for the coded PLC capacity (see Theorem 3). The significance of our PLC
converse is that, in contrast to [17], it is valid for any number of messages f and any number of candidate
linear combinations µ. In addition, our converse result depends on the rank of the coefficient matrix obtained
from all µ linear combinations.
• A capacity-achieving PLC scheme for a large class of linearly-coded DSSs with noncolluding databases is
proposed. Essentially, the proposed PLC scheme jointly extends the optimal PIR scheme from DSSs coded
with the MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes of [16] and the PLC scheme from MDS-coded DSSs of [20],
strictly generalizing the replication-based PC schemes of [17], [18]. As for the optimality of the achievable
3PLC rate, we prove that the achievable rate matches the PLC converse bound of Theorem 3 and settle the
coded PLC capacity (see Theorem 4).
• For higher degree PPC, i.e., g > 1, we present two new approaches for PPC from RS-coded DSSs by
generalizing the presented capacity-achieving PLC scheme and leveraging ideas from star-product PIR [15] and
Lagrange coded computation [26]. Although the problem of PPC from Lagrange encoded DSSs was recently
studied in [22], the authors were mainly concerned with constructing explicit PPC schemes with focus on
preserving privacy against colluding DSSs. We, on the other hand, aim our attention at providing PPC solutions
that minimize the download cost and we focus on establishing the capacity of the PPC setup. Towards that
aim, we propose two PPC schemes from RS-coded noncolluding databases with Lagrange encoding (one for
systematic encoding) that improve on the rate of the PPC schemes presented in [21], [22] (see Theorems 5 and
6). The systematic scheme is an improved version of the systematic scheme presented in [2]. To demonstrate
the performance of our proposed PPC schemes, a number of examples and numerical results are presented.
We show that, compared to the schemes in [21], [22], both proposed PPC schemes yield a larger PC rate, i.e.,
lower download cost, when the number of messages is small. As the number of messages tends to infinity, the
achievable rate of our RS-coded (nonsystematic) PPC scheme approaches the rate of [22] (see Corollary 1),
while our systematic scheme outperforms all known schemes up to some storage code rate that depends on
the maximum degree of the candidate polynomials (see Remark 1 and Corollary 2).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the notation and basic definitions, then
the problem of PPC from coded DSSs and the system model are presented. A motivating and almost self-contained
example is given in Section III. We derive the converse bound for an arbitrary number of messages and polynomial
functions in Section IV. A generic query generation scheme for PC for linearly-coded storage with an MDS-
PIR capacity-achieving code is presented in Section V. This scheme acts as a building block for the three schemes
constructed in the following sections. In Section VI we present the capacity-achieving PLC scheme. In Sections VII
and VIII, we propose two PPC schemes for RS-coded storage and higher degree polynomials with examples. Then,
in Section IX, numerical results for the proposed PPC schemes and the converse bound from Section IV are
presented, establishing the achievability of larger retrieval rates compared with PPC schemes from the literature.
Some conclusions are drawn in Section X.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
We denote by N the set of all positive integers and let N0 , {0} ∪ N, [a] , {1, 2, . . . , a}, and [a : b] ,
{a, a+ 1, . . . , b} for a, b ∈ N, a ≤ b. Random and deterministic quantities are carefully distinguished as follows. A
random variable is denoted by a capital Roman letter, e.g., X , while its realization is denoted by the corresponding
small Roman letter, e.g., x. Vectors are boldfaced, e.g., X denotes a random vector and x denotes a deterministic
vector, respectively. The notation X ∼ Y is used to indicate that X and Y are identically distributed. Random
matrices are represented by bold sans serif letters, e.g., X, where X represents its realization. In addition, sets are
denoted by calligraphic uppercase letters, e.g., X , and X c denotes the complement of a set X in a universe set. We
denote a submatrix of X that is restricted in columns by the set I by X|I . For a given index set S, we also write
XS and YS to represent
{
X(v) : v ∈ S} and {Yj : j ∈ S}, respectively. Furthermore, some constants and functions
are also depicted by Greek letters or a special font, e.g., X. The function H(X) represents the entropy of X , and
I(X ;Y ) the mutual information between X and Y . The binomial coefficient of a over b, a, b ∈ N0, is denoted by(
a
b
)
where
(
a
b
)
= 0 if a < b. The notation b·c denotes the floor function.
We use the customary code parameters [n, k] to denote a code C over the finite field Fq of blocklength n and
dimension k. A generator matrix of C is denoted by GC . A set of coordinates of C , I ⊆ [n], of size k is said to
be an information set if and only if GC |I is invertible. (·)T denotes the transpose operator, while rank(V) denotes
the rank of a matrix V. The function χ(x) denotes the support of a vector x, and the linear span of a set of vectors
{x1, . . . ,xa}, a ∈ N, is denoted by span{x1, . . . ,xa}.
A monomial zi in m variables z1, . . . , zm with degree g is written as zi = zi11 z
i2
2 · · · zimm , where i ,
(i1, . . . , im) ∈ Nm0 is the exponent vector with wt(i) ,
∑m
j=1 ij = g. The set {zi : i ∈ Nm0 , 1 ≤ wt(i) ≤ g} of all
4monomials in m variables of degree at most g has size
M(m, g) ,
g∑
h=1
(
h+m− 1
h
)
=
(
g +m
g
)
− 1.
Moreover, a polynomial φ(z) of degree at most g is represented as φ(z) =
∑
i:wt(i)≤g aiz
i, ai ∈ Fq. The
total number of polynomials in m variables of degree at most g generated with all possible distinct (up to scalar
multiplication) M(m, g)-dimensional coefficients vectors defined over Fq is equal to µ(m, g) , q
M(m,g)−1
q−1 . Finally,
Fq[z] denotes the set of all univariate polynomials over Fq in the variable z, and we denote by deg(φ(z)) the
degree of a polynomial φ(z) ∈ Fq[z].
B. Definitions
Definition 1 (Star-product). Let C and D be two linear codes of length n over Fq. The star-product (Hadamard
product) of v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ C and u = (u1, . . . , un) ∈ D is defined as v ? u = (v1u1, . . . , vnun) ∈ Fnq .
Further, the star-product of C and D , denoted by C ?D , is defined by span{v ?u : v ∈ C ,u ∈ D} and the g-fold
star-product of C with itself is given by C ?g = span{v1 ? · · · ? vg : vi ∈ C , i ∈ [g]}.
Definition 2 (RS code). Let α = (α1, . . . , αn) be a vector of n distinct elements of Fq. For n ∈ N, k ∈ [n], and
q ≥ n, the [n, k] RS code (over Fq) is defined as
RSk(α) , {(φ(α1), . . . , φ(αn)) : φ ∈ Fq[z], deg(φ) < k}. (1)
It is well-known that RS codes are MDS codes that behave well under the star-product. We state the following
proposition that was introduced in [15].
Proposition 1. Let RSk(α) be a length-n RS code. Then, for g ∈ N, the g-fold star-product of RSk(α) with itself
is the RS code given by RS?gk (α) = RSmin {g(k−1)+1,n}(α).
Let γ = (γ1, . . . , γk) be a vector of k distinct elements of Fq. For a message vector W = (W1, . . . ,Wk), let
`(z) ∈ Fq[z] be a polynomial of degree at most k − 1 such that `(γi) = Wi for all i ∈ [k]. Using the Lagrange
interpolation formula we present this polynomial as `(z) =
∑
i∈[k]Wiιi(z), where ιi(z) is the Lagrange basis
polynomial
ιi(z) =
∏
t∈[k]\{i}
z − γt
γi − γt .
It has been shown in [22] that Lagrange encoding is equivalent to the choice of a specific basis for an RS code.
Thus, for encoding we choose the set of Lagrange basis polynomials as the code generating polynomials of (1)
[26]. Thus, a generator matrix of RSk(α) is GRSk(α,γ) = (ιi(αj)), i ∈ [k], j ∈ [n]. Note that if we choose
γi = αi for i ∈ [k], then the generator matrix GRSk(α,γ) becomes systematic.
We now proceed with a general description for the problem statement of private function computation from
linearly-coded DSSs.
C. Problem Statement and System Model
The PC problem for coded DSSs is described as follows. We consider a DSS that stores in total f independent
messages W(1), . . . ,W(f), where each message W(m) =
(
W
(m)
i,j
)
, m ∈ [f ], is a random β × k matrix over Fq
with some β, k ∈ N. Let L , βk. Then, each message W(m), m ∈ [f ], can also be seen as a random vector
variable W(m) = (W (m)1 , . . . ,W
(m)
L ) of L symbols that are chosen independently and uniformly at random from
Fq. Thus, H(W(m)) = βk, ∀m ∈ [f ] (in q-ary units). Each message is encoded using an [n, k] code as follows.
Let W (m)i =
(
W
(m)
i,1 , . . . ,W
(m)
i,k
)
, i ∈ [β], be a message vector corresponding to the i-th row of W(m). Each
W
(m)
i is encoded by an [n, k] code C over Fq into a length-n codeword C
(m)
i =
(
C
(m)
i,1 , . . . , C
(m)
i,n
)
. The βf
generated codewords C(m)i are then arranged in the array C =
(
(C(1))T| . . . |(C(f))T)T of dimensions βf × n,
where C(m) =
(
(C
(m)
1 )
T| . . . |(C(m)β )T
)T
. The code symbols C(m)1,j , . . . , C
(m)
β,j , m ∈ [f ], for all f messages are
stored on the j-th database, j ∈ [n].
5Fig. 2: System model.
We consider the case of n noncolluding databases. In private function computation, a user wishes to privately
compute exactly one function image X(v)i , φ(v)(Wi), where Wi = (W
(1)
i , . . . ,W
(f)
i ), ∀ i ∈ [L], out of µ
arbitrary candidate functions φ(1), . . . , φ(µ) : Ffq → Fq from the coded DSS. Let X(v) =
(
X
(v)
1 , . . . , X
(v)
L
)
, where
X
(v)
1 , . . . , X
(v)
L are independent and identically distributed according to a prototype random variable X
(v) with prob-
ability mass function PX(v) . Thus, H(X
(v)) = LH(X(v)), ∀ v ∈ [µ], H(X(1), . . . ,X(µ)) = LH(X(1), . . . , X(µ)),
and we let Hmin , minv∈[µ]H
(
X(v)
)
and Hmax , maxv∈[µ]H
(
X(v)
)
.
The user privately selects an index v ∈ [µ] and wishes to compute the v-th function while keeping the requested
function index v private from each database. In order to retrieve the desired function evaluation X(v), v ∈ [µ], from
the coded DSS, the user sends a query Q(v)j to the j-th database for all j ∈ [n] as illustrated in Fig. 2. Since the
queries are generated by the user without any prior knowledge of the realizations of the candidate functions, the
queries are independent of the candidate functions evaluations. In other words, we have
I
(
X(1), . . . ,X(µ) ;Q
(v)
1 , . . . , Q
(v)
n
)
= 0, ∀ v ∈ [µ].
In response to the received query, database j sends the answer A(v)j back to the user. A
(v)
j is a deterministic function
of Q(v)j and the data stored in the database. Thus, ∀ v ∈ [µ],
H
(
A
(v)
j
∣∣∣Q(v)j ,Cj) = 0, ∀ j ∈ [n],
where Cj ,
(
C
(1)
1,j , . . . , C
(1)
β,j , C
(2)
1,j , . . . , C
(f)
β,j
)T
denotes the f coded chunks that are stored in the j-th database.
To preserve user’s privacy, the query-answer function must be identically distributed for each possible desired
function index v ∈ [µ] from the perspective of each database j ∈ [n]. In other words, the scheme’s queries and
answer strings must be independent from the desired function index. Moreover, the user must be able to reliably
decode the desired polynomial function evaluation X(v). Accordingly, we define a PC protocol for [n, k] coded
DSSs as follows.
Consider a DSS with n noncolluding databases storing f messages using an [n, k] code. The user wishes to
retrieve the v-th function evaluation X(v), v ∈ [µ], from the available information Q(v)j and A(v)j , j ∈ [n]. For a
PC protocol, the following conditions must be satisfied ∀ v, v′ ∈ [µ], v 6= v′, and ∀ j ∈ [n],
[Privacy] (Q(v)j , A
(v)
j ,X
[µ]) ∼ (Q(v′)j , A(v
′)
j ,X
[µ]), (2a)
[Recovery] H
(
X(v)
∣∣A(v)1 , . . . , A(v)n , Q(v)1 , . . . , Q(v)n ) = 0. (2b)
From an information-theoretic perspective, the efficiency of a PC protocol is measured by the PC rate, which is
defined as follows.
6Definition 3 (PC rate and capacity for linearly-coded DSSs). The exact information-theoretic rate of a PC scheme,
denoted by R, is defined as the ratio of the minimum desired function size LHmin over the total required download
cost, i.e.,
R , LHmin
D
,
where D is the total required download cost. The PC capacity CPC is the maximum of all achievable PC rates over
all possible PC protocols for a given [n, k] storage code.
D. MDS-PIR Capacity-Achieving Codes
In [16], a PIR protocol for any linearly-coded DSS that uses an [n, k] code to store f messages, named Protocol 1,
is proposed. The PIR rate of Protocol 1 can be derived by finding a PIR achievable rate matrix of the underlying
storage code C , which is defined as follows.
Definition 4 ([16, Def. 10]). Let C be an arbitrary [n, k] code. A ν × n binary matrix ΛPIRκ,ν(C ) is said to be a
PIR achievable rate matrix for C if the following conditions are satisfied.
1) The Hamming weight of each column of ΛPIRκ,ν is κ, and
2) for each matrix row λi, i ∈ [ν], χ(λi) always contains an information set.
In other words, each coordinate j of C , j ∈ [n], appears exactly κ times in {χ(λi)}i∈[ν], and every set χ(λi)
contains an information set.
Example 1. Consider a [4, 2] code C with generator matrix
GC =
(
1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1
)
.
One can verify that
ΛPIR1,2 =
(
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
)
is a valid PIR achievable rate matrix for C with (κ, ν) = (1, 2). This is true given that, column-wise, the Hamming
weight of each column in ΛPIR1,2 is κ = 1. On the other hand, row-wise, χ(λ1) = {1, 3} and χ(λ2) = {2, 4} are
two information sets of C .
In [16], it is shown that the MDS-PIR capacity [13] can be achieved using Protocol 1 for a special class of [n, k]
codes. In particular, to achieve the MDS-PIR capacity using Protocol 1, the [n, k] storage code should possess a
specific underlying structure as given by the following theorem.
Theorem 1 ([16, Cor. 1]). Consider a DSS that uses an [n, k] code C to store f messages. If a PIR achievable
rate matrix ΛPIRκ,ν(C ) with
κ
ν =
k
n exists, then the MDS-PIR capacity
CMDS-PIR ,
(
1− k
n
)[
1−
(k
n
)f]−1
is achievable.
This gives rise to the following definition.
Definition 5 ([16, Def. 13]). Given an [n, k] code C , if a PIR achievable rate matrix ΛPIRκ,ν(C ) with κν =
k
n exists,
then the code C is referred to as an MDS-PIR capacity-achieving code, and the matrix ΛPIRκ,ν(C ) is called an
MDS-PIR capacity-achieving matrix.
Accordingly, one can easily see that the [4, 2] code C given in Example 1 is an MDS-PIR capacity-achieving
code. Note that the class of MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes includes MDS codes, cyclic codes, Reed-Muller
codes, and certain classes of distance-optimal local reconstruction codes [16].
7III. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
To illustrate the key concept of the proposed PC schemes, in this subsection we present a motivating example
of PLC from replicated databases.
Consider three messages W(1), W(2), and W(3) that are stored in a DSS using a [2, 1] repetition code C .
Suppose that the user wishes to obtain a linear function evaluation X(v) from the set {X(1) = W(1) +W(3),X(2) =
W(1) +W(2),X(3) = X(1) + X(2),X(4) = 3X(1) + X(2)} of µ = 4 candidate linear function evaluations. First, to
make the symbols downloaded from each database appear random and independent from the desired linear function
index v, we first select a random permutation function over [β], denoted by pi(·), where β = 2µ = 16, and let
xt,j = φ
(1)(Cpi(t),j), yt,j = φ(2)(Cpi(t),j), zt,j = φ(3)(Cpi(t),j), and wt,j = φ(4)(Cpi(t),j) for all t ∈ [16], j ∈ [2],
where Ct,j ,
(
C
(1)
t,j , . . . , C
(3)
t,j
)T
. Let the desired linear function index be v = 1, i.e., the user wishes to obtain
X(1). To retrieve the desired linear function evaluation X(1), symbols are downloaded from the two databases in a
total of 4 rounds as shown in Table I.
Initialization (Round τ = 1): The user first downloads 1 distinct instance of xt,j from each database. By message
symmetry this also applies to yt,j , zt,j , and wt,j . The symbols downloaded in the first round are shown in Table I.
Following Rounds (τ ∈ [2 : 4]): As can be seen from Table I, in each round and for each database, the user
further downloads sums of τ symbols. The downloaded sums either contain a single symbol from the desired linear
function evaluation (so-called desired symbols) or only symbols from undesired linear functions evaluations (so-
called undesired symbols, referred to as side information in the sequel). One can see that by utilizing the undesired
symbols downloaded from the previous round, the desired linear function evaluations can be decoded. For example,
in round 3, since the storage code is a [2, 1] repetition code, the sum y7,1 + z6,1 can be obtained by knowing the
sum y7,2 + z6,2 downloaded from the 2nd database in round 2. Thus, the corresponding desired symbol x9,1 can
be obtained by cancelling the side information. Similarly, one can verify the successful recovery of all symbols of
the desired message X(1) from the queried desired sums shown in Table I. Note that after deciding which desired
sums to download, the undesired sums to download can be decided by enforcing message symmetry. Moreover,
given that this PC scheme is following the symmetry principles of PIR schemes, in the same way as for the PIR
scheme in [11], privacy is inherently ensured.
TABLE I: Sums downloaded for the retrieval of the first linear function evaluation for the example of Section III.
Database 1 2
x1,1 x2,2
Round 1
y1,1 y2,2
z1,1 z2,2
w1,1 w2,2
x3,1 + y2,1 x6,2 + y1,2
x4,1 + z2,1 x7,2 + z1,2
Round 2
x5,1 + w2,1 x8,2 + w1,2
y4,1 + z3,1 y7,2 + z6,2
y5,1 + w3,1 y8,2 + w6,2
z5,1 + w4,1 z8,2 + w7,2
x9,1 + y7,1 + z6,1 x12,2 + y4,2 + z3,2
Round 3
x10,1 + y8,1 + w6,1 x13,2 + y5,2 + w3,2
x11,1 + z8,1 + w7,1 x14,2 + z5,2 + w4,2
y11,1 + z10,1 + w9,1 y14,2 + z13,2 + w12,2
Round 4 x15,1 + y14,1 + z13,1 + w12,1 x16,2 + y11,2 + z10,2 + w9,2
Linear Dependency Exploitation: It is important to highlight that the linear dependencies among the candidate
linear function evaluations can further be used to reduce the total number of downloaded symbols. From the
initialization step, i.e., round τ = 1, it can be easily seen that since X(3) and X(4) are linear combinations of X(1)
8and X(2), the symbols zt,j and wt,j can be reconstructed offline by the user and thus can be removed from the
download. However, for the following rounds τ > 1 we need to introduce constructive linear dependencies among
the sums to be exploited offline. To this end, we adopt a deterministic sign assignment procedure over {+1,−1} to
each symbol in the downloaded sums based on the desired linear function index v as introduced in [17, Sec. IV-B].
Here, a sign σ(v)t ∈ {+1,−1} is first privately generated by the user with a uniform distribution over {−1,+1}
and appended to all query symbols with the same index t ∈ [β]. This sign acts as a one-time pad to maintain
privacy by randomizing over the deterministic sign assignment procedure, as elaborated below. Specifically, each
symbol in the query sets is carefully scaled by {+1,−1} following the deterministic sign assignment procedure
to introduce a solvable system of linear equations based on the downloaded sums from different databases. The
resulting sums to download after sign assignment are shown in Table II where the redundant sums are marked in
blue. Moreover, to illustrate that the deterministic sign assignment procedure depends on the desired linear function,
we include in Table II the query set of the 1st database for retrieving the linear function X(3), i.e., v = 3. Note
that after removing the redundant sums from each database, the desired function evaluations can still be recovered.
For example, consider the 1st database. One can easily see that the symbols z1,1 and w1,1 are redundant in round
1. Moreover, in round 2, one can verify that
1(y5,1 − w3,1)− 1(y4,1 − z3,1)− (1 · 1− 3 · 1)x3,1 − 3x4,1 + 1x5,1
= 1(y5,1 − 3x3,1 − 1y3,1)− (y4,1 − x3,1 − y3,1) + 2x3,1 − 3x4,1 + x5,1
= (x5,1 + y5,1)− (3x4,1 + y4,1) = z5,1 − w4,1, (3)
and hence we do not need to download the sum z5,1 −w4,1. In a similar manner, redundant sums can be removed
from the download from the 2nd database.
TABLE II: Sums downloaded after sign assignment for the retrieval of the first linear function evaluation for the
example of Section III. For the 1st database, the sums to be downloaded for v = 3 are also listed to demonstrate
the deterministic sign assignment for a different desired message X(3). The redundant sums are marked in blue.
Database 1 2
v 1 3 1
x1,1 x1,1 x2,2
Round 1
y1,1 y1,1 y2,2
z1,1 z1,1 z2,2
w1,1 w1,1 w2,2
x3,1 − y2,1 x4,1 − y3,1 x6,2 − y1,2
x4,1 − z2,1 x2,1 − z3,1 x7,2 − z1,2
Round 2
x5,1 − w2,1 x5,1 − w3,1 x8,2 − w1,2
y4,1 − z3,1 y2,1 − z4,1 y7,2 − z6,2
y5,1 − w3,1 y5,1 − w4,1 y8,2 − w6,2
z5,1 − w4,1 z5,1 − w2,1 z8,2 − w7,2
x9,1 − y7,1 + z6,1 x7,1 − y6,1 + z9,1 x12,2 − y4,2 + z3,2
Round 3
x10,1 − y8,1 + w6,1 x11,1 − y10,1 + w9,1 x13,2 − y5,2 + w3,2
x11,1 − z8,1 + w7,1 −x8,1 − z10,1 + w6,1 x14,2 − z5,2 + w4,2
y11,1 − z10,1 + w9,1 −y8,1 − z11,1 + w7,1 y14,2 − z13,2 + w12,2
Round 4 x15,1 − y14,1 + z13,1 − w12,1 x14,1 − y13,1 + z15,1 + w12,1 x16,2 − y11,2 + z10,2 − w9,2
To see that the user’s privacy is still maintained after the removal of redundant sums, we show that the sums
are identically distributed for any v ∈ [4]. First note that the privacy before removal of redundant sums is already
ensured due to the symmetries of the query sets and the user-private random index permutation and sign assignment
σ(v). Thus, we only need to show that for any desired index v ∈ [4], the removed redundant sums are of the form
of z∗,1 − w∗,1, irrespective of the row indices. For instance, consider the 1st database. In the 1st round, it is clear
9that z1,1 and w1,1 are redundant, no matter which v is requested. In the 2nd round, see again Table II, it can be
shown that the downloaded sums for desired index v = 3 satisfy the equation
(1 · 1− 3 · 1)(x4,1 − y3,1)− 1(x5,1 − w3,1)− 3z3,1 − 1z4,1 + 1z5,1
= −2(x4,1 − y3,1)− (x5,1 − 3x3,1 − y3,1)− 3(x3,1 + y3,1)− (x4,1 + y4,1) + (x5,1 + y5,1)
= 1y5,1 − (3x4,1 + y4,1) = y5,1 − w4,1,
which implies that the sum z5,1 − w2,1 can be removed from the download, since z5,1 can be obtained from
downloading x4,1 − y3,1, x5,1 − w3,1, x2,1 − z3,1, y2,1 − z4,1, and y5,1 − w4,1. Hence, the redundant symbol for
v = 3 is similar to the form of z∗,1 − w∗,1 as for v = 1 (see (3)). A similar argument can be made for v = 2 and
v = 4, which ensures the privacy of the scheme.
The PLC rate becomes R = 1612·2 =
2
3 , which is equal to the corresponding PIR capacity for 3 messages.
In summary, from the example above we can extract three important design principles as follows.
1) Enforce message symmetry within the dowloaded sums from each database.
2) Exploit side information of undesired sums downloaded from other databases to retrieve desired function
evaluations.
3) Utilize linear dependencies among the candidate functions evaluations.
IV. CONVERSE BOUND
In [23], [24], the PIR capacity for a coded DSS using an MDS-PIR capacity-achieving code is shown to be
equal to the MDS-PIR capacity. In this section, we derive an outer bound on the PPC rate (Theorem 2 below) by
adapting the converse proof of [24, Thm. 4] to the scenario of the linearly-coded PPC problem, where the storage
code is MDS-PIR capacity-achieving. The converse is valid for any number of messages f and candidate functions
µ. Then, we state the converse bound for PLC, as a special case, in Theorem 3 and show that it matches the
MDS-PIR capacity (i.e., the PIR capacity for a DSS where data is encoded and stored using an MDS code).
We first define an effective rank for the PC problem as follows.
Definition 6. Let X[µ] = {X(1), . . . ,X(µ)} denote the set of candidate functions evaluations where X(`) =(
X
(`)
1 , . . . , X
(`)
L
)
, ` ∈ [µ]. The effective rank r(X[µ]) is defined as
r
(
X[µ]
)
, min
{
s : H
(
X
(`1)
l , . . . , X
(`s)
l
)
= H
(
X
[µ]
l
)
, {`1, . . . , `s} ⊆ [µ], s ∈ [µ], l ∈ [L]
}
, (4)
and we define the set L , {`1, . . . , `r} ⊆ [µ] to be a minimum set that satisfies (4).
Note that, when the candidate functions are of degree at most g = 1, it can be seen that there is a deterministic
linear mapping V of size µ × f between (X(1)l , . . . , X(µ)l ) and (W (1)l , . . . ,W (f)l ), i.e., it reduces to the PLC
problem where 
X
(1)
l
...
X
(µ)
l
 = Vµ×f

W
(1)
l
...
W
(f)
l
, (5)
and r
(
X[µ]
)
= rank(V) ≤ min{µ, f}.
Accordingly, an upper bound on the capacity of PPC for a coded DSS where data is encoded and stored using
an MDS-PIR capacity-achieving code introduced in Definition 5, is stated in the following.
A. General Converse
Theorem 2. Consider a DSS with n noncolluding databases that uses an [n, k] MDS-PIR capacity-achieving code
C to store f messages. Then, the maximum achievable PPC rate over all possible PPC protocols, i.e., the PPC
capacity CPPC, is upper bounded by
CPPC ≤ Hmin
H
(B)
min +
∑r−1
v=1
(
k
n
)v
H
(
X(`v+1)
∣∣X(`1), . . . , X(`v)) ,
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for any effective rank r
(
X[µ]
)
= r, where H(B)min , min`∈LH
(
X(`)
)
.
Here, we remark that Theorem 2 generalizes [19, Thm. 1], which is a converse bound on the capacity of dependent
PIR (DPIR) for noncolluding replicated databases.
Before we proceed with the converse proof, we provide some general results that are useful for the proof.
1) From the condition of privacy,
H
(
A
(v)
j
∣∣X(v),Q) = H(A(v′)j ∣∣X(v),Q), (6)
where v 6= v′, v, v′ ∈ [µ], and Q , {Q(v)j : v ∈ [µ], j ∈ [n]} denotes the set of all possible queries made by
the user. Although this seems to be intuitively true, a proof of this property is still required and can be found
in [13].
2) Consider a PPC protocol for a coded DSS that uses an [n, k] code C to store f messages. For any subset of
function evaluations XV , V ⊆ [µ], and for any information set I of C , we have
H
(
A
(v)
I
∣∣XV ,Q) = ∑
j∈I
H
(
A
(v)
j
∣∣XV ,Q). (7)
The proof uses the linear independence of the columns of a generator matrix of C corresponding to an
information set, and can be seen as a simple extension of [13, Lem. 1]. This argument applies to the case of
PPC due to the fact that A(v)I is still a deterministic function of independent random variables {Cj : j ∈ I}
and Q.
Next, we state Shearer’s Lemma, which represents a very useful entropy method for combinatorial problems.
Lemma 1 (Shearer’s Lemma [27]). Let S be a collection of subsets of [n], with each j ∈ [n] included in at least
κ members of S . For random variables Z1, . . . , Zn, we have∑
S∈S
H(ZS) ≥ κH(Z1, . . . , Zn).
Now, we are ready for the converse proof. By [16, Lem. 2], since the code C is MDS-PIR capacity-achieving,
there exist ν information sets I1, . . . , Iν such that each coordinate j ∈ [n] is included in exactly κ members of
I = {I1, . . . , Iν} with κν = kn .
Applying the chain rule of entropy we have
H
(
A
(v)
[n]
∣∣XV ,Q) ≥ H(A(v)Ii ∣∣XV ,Q), ∀ i ∈ [ν].
Let v ∈ V and v′ ∈ Vc , [µ] \ V . Following similar steps as in the proof given in [13], [28], we get
νH
(
A
(v)
[n]
∣∣XV ,Q) ≥ ν∑
i=1
H
(
A
(v)
Ii
∣∣XV ,Q)
=
ν∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ii
H
(
A
(v)
j
∣∣XV ,Q)
 (8)
=
ν∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ii
H
(
A
(v′)
j
∣∣XV ,Q)
 (9)
=
ν∑
i=1
H
(
A
(v′)
Ii
∣∣XV ,Q) (10)
≥ κH(A(v′)[n] ∣∣XV ,Q) (11)
= κ
[
H
(
A
(v′)
[n] ,X
(v′) ∣∣XV ,Q)−H(X(v′) ∣∣A(v′)[n] ,XV ,Q)]
= κ
[
H
(
X(v
′) ∣∣XV ,Q)+ H(A(v′)[n] ∣∣XV ,X(v′),Q)− 0] (12)
= κ
[
H
(
X(v
′) ∣∣XV)+H(A(v′)[n] ∣∣XV ,X(v′),Q)], (13)
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where (8) and (10) follow from (7); (9) is because of (6); (11) is due to the Shearer’s Lemma; (12) is from the fact
that the v′-th function evaluation X(v
′) is determined by the answers A(v
′)
[n] and all possible queries Q; and finally,
(13) follows from the independence between all possible queries and the messages. Therefore, we can conclude
that
H
(
A
(v)
[n]
∣∣XV ,Q) ≥ κ
ν
H
(
X(v
′) ∣∣XV)+ κ
ν
H
(
A
(v′)
[n]
∣∣XV ,X(v′),Q)
=
k
n
H
(
X(v
′) ∣∣XV)+ k
n
H
(
A
(v′)
[n]
∣∣XV ,X(v′),Q), (14)
where we have used Definition 5 to obtain (14).
Since there are in total µ function evaluations, by Definition 6 we can recursively use (14) r − 1 times with
L = {`1, . . . , `r} ⊆ [µ] to obtain
H
(
A
(`1)
[n]
∣∣X(`1),Q) ≥ r−1∑
v=1
(k
n
)v
H
(
X(`v+1)
∣∣X{`1,...,`v})+ (k
n
)r−1
H
(
A
(`r)
[n]
∣∣X{`1,...,`r},Q)
≥
r−1∑
v=1
(k
n
)v
H
(
X(`v+1)
∣∣X{`1,...,`v}) (15)
where (15) follows from the nonnegativity of entropy. Here, we also remark that the recursive steps follow the same
principle of the general converse for DPIR from [19, Thm. 1]. In [19], the authors claim that the general converse
for the DPIR problem strongly depends on the chosen permutation of the indices of the candidate functions. Here,
we also recognize a similar observation and assume that the order of indices {`1, . . . , `r} is the permutation that
maximizes the summation term of (15) and consider that X(`1) is the polynomial function evaluation with the
minimum entropy, i.e., H
(
X(`1)
)
= LH
(B)
min. Now,
LH(X(`1)) = H
(
X(`1)
)
= H
(
X(`1)
∣∣Q)−H(X(`1) ∣∣A(`1)[n] ,Q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
(16)
= I
(
X(`1) ;A
(`1)
[n]
∣∣Q)
= H
(
A
(`1)
[n]
∣∣∣Q)−H(A(`1)[n] ∣∣∣X(`1),Q)
≤ H
(
A
(`1)
[n]
∣∣∣Q)− r−1∑
v=1
(k
n
)v
H
(
X(`v+1)
∣∣X(`1), . . . ,X(`v)), (17)
where (16) holds since any message is independent of the queries Q, and knowing the answers A(`1)[n] and the
queries Q, one can determine X(`1), and (17) follows directly from (15).
Finally, the converse proof is completed by showing that
R =
LHmin∑n
j=1H
(
A
(`1)
j
)
≤ LHmin
H
(
A
(`1)
[n]
) (18)
≤ LHmin
H
(
A
(`1)
[n]
∣∣Q) (19)
≤ Hmin
H
(B)
min +
∑r−1
v=1
(
k
n
)v
H
(
X(`v+1)
∣∣X(`1), . . . , X(`v)) , (20)
where (18) holds because of the chain rule of entropy, (19) is due to the fact that conditioning reduces entropy,
and we apply (17) to obtain (20).
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B. Special Case: PLC Converse
Restricting the candidate polynomial set to degree g = 1 polynomials gives rise to an interesting property
following the linear dependencies between the function evaluations. In this subsection, we show how this property
will reduce the general coded PPC converse bound to the coded PLC converse stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Consider a DSS with n noncolluding databases that uses an [n, k] MDS-PIR capacity-achieving code
C to store f messages. Then, the maximum achievable PLC rate over all possible PLC protocols, i.e., the PLC
capacity CPLC, is upper bounded by
CPLC ≤ 1
1 +
∑r−1
v=1
(
k
n
)v = (1− kn)
[
1−
(k
n
)r]−1
,
where r is the rank of the linear mapping from (5).
To this end, we need the following lemma, whose proof is presented in Appendix A.
Lemma 2. Consider the linear mapping V = (vi,j) defined in (5) with rank(V) = r where vi1,j1 , . . . , vir,jr are
the entries corresponding to the pivot elements of V. It follows that
(
X(i1), . . . ,X(ih)
)
and
(
W(j1), . . . ,W(jh)
)
are identically distributed, for some h ∈ [r]. In other words, H(X(i1), . . . ,X(ih)) = LH(X(i1), . . . , X(ih)) = hL,
h ∈ [r].
Proof of Theorem 3: Now, from (20), we have
R ≤ Hmin
H
(B)
min +
∑r−1
v=1
(
k
n
)v
H
(
X(`v+1)
∣∣X(`1), . . . , X(`v))
=
Hmin
H
(B)
min +
∑r−1
v=1
(
k
n
)v , (21)
where (21) holds since it follows from Lemma 2 that H
(
X(`v+1)
∣∣X{`1,...,`v}) = H(X(`v+1)) = 1. For the PLC
case, Hmin = H
(B)
min = 1, and the claim follows.
It can be easily seen that the converse bound of Theorem 3 matches the MDS-PIR capacity CMDS-PIR for f = r
files given in Theorem 1.
V. GENERIC QUERY GENERATION FOR PC FROM CODED DSSS
In this section, we construct a generic query generation algorithm for a PIR-like scheme, where its dependent
virtual messages represent the evaluations of the µ candidate polynomial functions. The constructed generic
algorithm is a generalized version of our query generation algorithm for PLC from coded DSSs, that first appeared
in [1], and will act as the main building block for the PC schemes presented in this work.
A. Generic PC Achievable Rate Matrix
Similar to Definition 4, we now extend the notion of a PIR achievable rate matrix for the coded PIR problem to
a coded generic PC problem.
Definition 7. A ν × n binary matrix ΛPCκ,ν is called a generic PC achievable rate matrix if its column weight is
equal to κ, i.e., ΛPCκ,ν is a κ-column regular matrix.
Clearly, a PIR achievable rate matrix ΛPIRκ,ν is a generic PC achievable rate matrix. In general, the condition for
each row for a generic PC achievable rate matrix is not given, since it is not needed for generating the queries
from our proposed algorithm. The required condition for each row of a particular PC achievable rate matrix will
be specified in the subsequent sections, depending on the specific PC scheme considered.
In [16, Def. 11], two PIR interference matrices are defined from a PIR achievable rate matrix. Similar to the
notion of PIR interference matrices, given a generic PC achievable rate matrix ΛPCκ,ν , we can also formally define
the PC interference matrices Aκ×n and B(ν−κ)×n, which are given by the following definition.
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Definition 8. For a given ν×n generic PC achievable rate matrix ΛPCκ,ν(C ) = (λu,j), we define the PC interference
matrices Aκ×n = (ai,j) and B(ν−κ)×n = (bi,j) for the code C as
ai,j , u if λu,j = 1, ∀j ∈ [n], i ∈ [κ], u ∈ [ν],
bi,j , u if λu,j = 0, ∀j ∈ [n], i ∈ [ν − κ], u ∈ [ν].
Note that in Definition 8, for each j ∈ [n], distinct values of u ∈ [ν] should be assigned for all i. Thus, the
assignment is not unique in the sense that the order of the entries of each column of A and B can be permuted.
For j ∈ [n], let Aj , {ai,j : i ∈ [κ]} and Bj , {bi,j : i ∈ [ν −κ]}. Note that the j-th column of Aκ×n contains the
row indices of Λκ,ν whose entries in the j-th column are equal to 1, while B(ν−κ)×n contains the remaining row
indices of Λκ,ν . Hence, it can be observed that Bj = [ν] \ Aj , ∀ j ∈ [n].
Next, for the sake of illustrating our generic query generation algorithm, we make use of the following definition.
Definition 9. By S(u|Aκ×n) we denote the set of column coordinates of matrix Aκ×n = (ai,j) in which at least
one of its entries is equal to u, i.e.,
S(u|Aκ×n) , {j ∈ [n] : ∃ ai,j = u, i ∈ [κ]}.
As a result, we require the size of the message to be L = νµ · k (i.e., β = νµ).
B. Generic Query Generation
In this subsection, we construct the generic queries that will be used in a coded PC scheme for µ dependent
virtual messages, which represent the evaluations of the µ candidate functions. Before running the main algorithm to
generate the query sets, the following index preparation for the coded symbols stored in each database is performed.
1) Index Preparation: The goal is to make the symbols queried from each database to appear to be chosen
randomly and independently from the desired function index. Note that the function is computed separately for the
t-th row of all messages, t ∈ [β]. Therefore, similar to the PLC scheme in [17] and the MDS-coded PLC scheme
in [20], we apply a permutation that is fixed across all coded symbols for the t-th row to maintain the dependency
across the associated message elements. Let pi(·) be a random permutation function over [β], and let
U
(v′)
t,j , φ(v
′)(Cpi(t),j), t ∈ [β], j ∈ [n], v′ ∈ [µ], (22)
denote the t-th permuted symbol associated with the v′-th virtual message X(v
′) stored in the j-th database, where
Ct,j ,
(
C
(1)
t,j , . . . , C
(f)
t,j
)T
. The permutation pi(·) is randomly selected privately and uniformly by the user.
2) Preliminaries: The query generation procedure is subdivided into µ rounds, where in each round τ we generate
the queries based on the concept of τ -sums as defined in the following.
Definition 10 (τ -sum). For τ ∈ [µ], a sum U (v1)i1,j + U
(v2)
i2,j
+ · · ·+ U (vτ )iτ ,j , j ∈ [n], of τ distinct symbols is called a
τ -sum for any (i1, . . . , iτ ) ∈ [β]τ , and {v1, . . . , vτ} ⊆ [µ] determines the type of the τ -sum.
Since we have
(
µ
τ
)
different selections of τ distinct elements out of µ elements, a τ -sum can have
(
µ
τ
)
different
types. For a requested function evaluation indexed by v ∈ [µ], a query set Q(v)j , j ∈ [n], is composed of µ disjoint
subsets, one generated by each round τ ∈ [µ], where a round represents the queries for all possible (µτ) types of
τ -sums. For each round the query subset is further subdivided into two subsets. The first subset Q(v)j (D; τ) consists
of τ -sums with a single symbol from the desired function evaluation and τ − 1 symbols from the evaluations of
undesired functions, while the second subset Q(v)j (U ; τ) contains τ -sums with symbols only from the evaluations of
undesired functions. Here, D is an indicator for “desired function evaluations”, while U an indicator for “undesired
functions evaluations”. Note that we require κµ−(τ−1)(ν − κ)τ−1 distinct instances of each τ -sum type for every
query set Q(v)j . To this end, the algorithm will generate κn auxiliary query sets Q
(v)
j (ai,j ,D; τ), i ∈ [κ], where
each query consists of a distinct symbol from the desired function evaluation and τ − 1 symbols from undesired
functions evaluations, and (ν − κ)n auxiliary query sets Q(v)j (bi,j ,U ; τ), i ∈ [ν − κ], to represent the query sets
of symbols from the undesired functions evaluations for each database j ∈ [n]. We utilize these sets to generate
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the query sets of each round according to the PC interference matrices Aκ×n and B(ν−κ)×n. The query sets for all
databases are generated by Algorithm 1 through the following procedures.1
3) Initialization (Round τ = 1): In the initialization step, the algorithm generates the auxiliary queries for the first
round. This round is described in lines 5 to 11 of Algorithm 1, where we have τ = 1 for the τ -sum. At this point,
Algorithm 1 invokes the subroutine Initial-Round given in Algorithm 2 to generate Q(v)j (ai,j ,D; 1), i ∈ [κ],
such that each of these query sets contains α1 = κµ−1 distinct symbols. Furthermore, to maintain function symmetry,
the algorithm asks each database for the same number of distinct symbols of all other functions evaluations in
Q
(v)
j (ai,j ,U ; 1), i ∈ [κ], resulting in a total number of
(
µ−1
1
)
κµ−1 symbols. As a result, the queried symbols in
the auxiliary query sets for each database are symmetric with respect to all function evaluation vectors indexed by
v′ ∈ [µ]. We associate the symbols of undesired functions evaluations in κ groups, each placed in the undesired
query sets Q(v)j (ai,j ,U ; 1), i ∈ [κ]. Since this procedure produces κ undesired query sets for each database, database
symmetry is maintained.
4) Desired Function Symbols for Rounds τ > 1: For the following rounds a similar process is repeated in terms
of generating auxiliary query sets containing distinct symbols from the desired function evaluation U(v) = (U (v)t,j ).
This is accomplished in lines 16 to 18 by calling the subroutine Desired-Q, given in Algorithm 3, to generate
Q
(v)
j (ai,j ,D; τ), i ∈ [κ], such that each of these query sets contains (ατ − 1)−ατ−1 + 1 =
(
µ−1
τ−1
)
κµ−(τ−1+1)(ν −
κ)τ−1 distinct symbols from the desired function evaluation U(v).
5) Side Information Exploitation: In lines 20 to 22, we generate the side information query sets Q(v)j (bi′,j ,U ; τ−
1), i′ ∈ [ν−κ], from the auxiliary query sets Q(v)1 (ai,1,U ; τ − 1), . . . , Q(v)n (ai,n,U ; τ − 1), i ∈ [κ], of the previous
round τ − 1, τ ∈ [2 : µ], by applying the subroutine Exploit-SI, given by Algorithm 4. This subroutine is
extended from [17] based on our coded storage scenario. These side information query sets will be exploited by
the user to ensure the recovery and privacy of the subsequent PC schemes. Note that in Algorithm 4 the function
Reproduce(j,Q(v)j′ (u,U ; τ − 1)), j′ ∈ [n] \ {j}, simply reproduces all the queries in the auxiliary query set
Q
(v)
j′ (u,U ; τ − 1) with a different coordinate j.
Next, we update the desired query sets Q(v)j (ai,j ,D; τ) in lines 25 to 31. First, the function
Partition
(
Q˜
(v)
j (U ; τ − 1)
)
denotes a procedure that divides a set into κ disjoint equally-sized subsets. This
is viable since based on the subroutine Initial-Round and the following subroutine M-Sym, one can show
that
∣∣Q˜(v)j (U ; τ − 1)∣∣ = (µ−1τ−1)κµ−(τ−1)(ν − κ)(τ−1)−1 · (ν − κ) for each round τ ∈ [2 : µ], which is always
divisible by κ. Secondly, we assign the new query set of desired symbols Q(v)j (ai,j ,D; τ) for the current round
by using an element-wise set addition SetAddition(Q1, Q2). The element-wise set addition is defined as{
qil + qi′l : qil ∈ Q1, qi′l ∈ Q2, l ∈ [ρ]
}
with |Q1| = |Q2| = ρ, where ρ is an appropriate integer. In lines 33
to 37, the subroutine M-Sym, given in Algorithm 5, is invoked to generate the undesired query sets Q(v)j (ai,j ,U ; τ)
by utilizing message symmetry. This subroutine selects symbols of undesired functions evaluations to generate
τ -sums that enforce symmetry in the round queries. The procedure resembles the subroutine M-Sym proposed in
[17]. In Algorithm 5, Πτ denotes the set of all possible selections of τ distinct indices in [µ] and Lexico(Πτ )
denotes the corresponding set of ordered selections (the indices (v1, . . . , vτ ) of a selection of Πτ are ordered in
natural lexicographical order). Further, the notation U (vx)∗,j implies that the row index of the symbol can be arbitrary.
This is the case since only the function indices (v1, . . . , vτ ) are necessary to determine iz, ∀ z ∈ [τ ]. As a result,
symmetry over the functions is maintained. Moreover, for Q(v)j (ai,j ,U ; τ), i ∈ [κ], we obtain for each τ ∈ [2 : µ]
the remaining τ -sum types, such that each of these query sets contains
(
µ−1
τ
)
κµ−(τ−1+1)(ν − κ)τ−1 symbols.
6) Query Set Assembly: Finally, in lines 39 to 48, we assemble each query set from disjoint query subsets
obtained in all τ rounds. It can be shown that Q(v)j (D; τ) ∪ Q(v)j (U ; τ) contains κµ−(τ−1)(ν − κ)τ−1 τ -sums for
every τ -sum type as follows.
For the initialization round, τ = 1, from step 3) above, the total number of queried symbols is given by∣∣Q(v)j (D; 1) ∪Q(v)j (U ; 1)∣∣ = κ[κµ−1 + (µ− 11
)
κµ−1
]
=
(
µ
1
)
κµ−1+1(ν − κ)1−1.
1Note that a query Q(v)j sent to the j-th database usually indicates the row indices of the symbols that the user requests, while the answer
A
(v)
j to the query Q
(v)
j refers to the particular symbols requested through the query. In Algorithm 1, with some abuse of notation for the
sake of simplicity, the generated queries are sets containing their answers.
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Algorithm 1: Q-Gen
Input : v, µ, κ, ν, n, Aκ×n, and B(ν−κ)×n
Output: Q(v)1 , . . . , Q
(v)
n
1 for τ ∈ [µ] do
2 Q
(v)
j (D; τ)← ∅, Q(v)j (U ; τ)← ∅, j ∈ [n]
3 ατ ← κµ−1 +
∑τ−1
h=1
(
µ−1
h
)
κµ−(h+1)(ν − κ)h
4 . Generate query sets for the initial round
5 if τ = 1 then
6 for u ∈ [ν] do
7 for j ∈ S(u|Aκ×n) do
8 Q
(v)
j (u,D; τ), Q(v)j (u,U ; τ)← Initial-Round(u, ατ , j, v, τ)
9 end
10 end
11 end
12 . Generate query sets for the following rounds τ > 1
13 else
14 for u ∈ [ν] do
15 . Generate desired symbols for the following rounds τ > 1
16 for j ∈ S(u|Aκ×n) do
17 Q
(v)
j (u,D; τ)← Desired-Q(u, ατ , j, v, τ)
18 end
19 . Generate side information for the following rounds τ > 1
20 for j ∈ S(u|B(ν−κ)×n) do
21 Q
(v)
j (u,U ; τ − 1)← Exploit-SI(u,Q(v)1 (u,U , τ − 1), . . . , Q(v)n (u,U , τ − 1), j, v, τ)
22 end
23 end
24 . Generate the final desired query sets for the following rounds τ > 1
25 for j ∈ [n] do
26 Q˜
(v)
j (U ; τ − 1)←
⋃
i∈[ν−κ]
Q
(v)
j (bi,j ,U ; τ − 1)
27 Q˜
(v)
j (1,U ; τ − 1), . . . , Q˜(v)j (κ,U ; τ − 1)← Partition
(
Q˜
(v)
j (U ; τ − 1)
)
28 for i ∈ [κ] do
29 Q
(v)
j (ai,j ,D; τ)← SetAddition
(
Q
(v)
j (ai,j ,D; τ), Q˜(v)j (i,U ; τ − 1)
)
30 end
31 end
32 . Generate the query sets of undesired symbols by forcing message symmetry for
the following rounds τ > 1
33 for u ∈ [ν] do
34 for j ∈ S(u|Aκ×n) do
35 Q
(v)
j (u,U ; τ)← M-Sym
(
Q
(v)
j (u,D; τ), j, v, τ
)
36 end
37 end
38 end
39 for u ∈ [ν] do
40 for j ∈ S(u|Aκ×n) do
41 Q
(v)
j (D; τ)← Q(v)j (D; τ) ∪Q(v)j (u,D; τ)
42 Q
(v)
j (U ; τ)← Q(v)j (U ; τ) ∪Q(v)j (u,U ; τ)
43 end
44 end
45 end
46 for j ∈ [n] do
47 Q
(v)
j ←
⋃
τ∈[µ]
(
Q
(v)
j (D; τ) ∪Q(v)j (U ; τ)
)
48 end
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Algorithm 2: Initial-Round
Input : u, ατ , j, v, and τ
Output: ϕ(v)(u,D; τ), ϕ(v)(u,U ; τ)
1 ϕ(v)(u,D; τ)← ∅, ϕ(v)(u,U ; τ)← ∅
2 for l ∈ [ατ ] do
3 ϕ(v)(u,D; τ)← ϕ(v)(u,D; τ) ∪ {U (v)(u−1)·ατ+l,j}
4 ϕ(v)(u,U ; τ)← ϕ(v)(u,U ; τ) ∪
(
µ⋃
v′=1
{
U
(v′)
(u−1)·ατ+l,j
} \ {U (v)(u−1)·ατ+l,j})
5 end
Algorithm 3: Desired-Q
Input : u, ατ , j, v, and τ
Output: ϕ(v)(u,D; τ)
1 ϕ(v)(u,D; τ)← ∅
2 for l ∈ [ατ−1 : ατ − 1] do
3 ϕ(v)(u,D; τ)← ϕ(v)(u,D; τ) ∪ {U (v)l·ν+u,j}
4 end
Algorithm 4: Exploit-SI
Input : u, Q(v)1 (u,U ; τ − 1), . . . , Q(v)n (u,U ; τ − 1), j, v, and τ
Output: ϕ(v)(u,U ; τ − 1)
1 ϕ(v)(u,U ; τ − 1)← ∅
2 for i ∈ [κ] do
3 for j′ ∈ [n] \ {j} do
4 if u = ai,j′ then
5 ϕ(v)(u,U ; τ − 1)← Reproduce(j,Q(v)j′ (u,U ; τ − 1))
6 break
7 end
8 end
9 end
Algorithm 5: M-Sym
Input : Q(v)j (u,D; τ), j, v, and τ
Output: ϕ(v)(u,U ; τ)
1 ϕ(v)(u,U ; τ)← ∅
2 for (v1, . . . , vτ ) ∈ Lexico(Πτ ), v /∈ {v1, . . . , vτ} do
3 ϕ(v)(u,U ; τ)← ϕ(v)(u,U ; τ) ∪ {U (v1)i1,j + . . .+ U (vτ )iτ ,j } such that ∀ z ∈ [τ ], ∃U (v)iz,j + ∑
x∈[τ ]
x6=z
U
(vx)
∗,j ∈ Q(v)j (u,D; τ)
4 end
For the following rounds, τ ∈ [2 : µ], from steps 4) and 5) above, we have∣∣Q(v)j (D; τ) ∪Q(v)j (U ; τ)∣∣ = κ[(µ− 1τ − 1
)
κµ−τ (ν − κ)τ−1 +
(
µ− 1
τ
)
κµ−τ (ν − κ)τ−1
]
=
((
µ− 1
τ − 1
)
+
(
µ− 1
τ
))
κµ−τ+1(ν − κ)τ−1
=
(
µ
τ
)
κµ−τ+1(ν − κ)τ−1.
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In summary, the total number of queries generated by Algorithm 1 is
n∑
j=1
∣∣Q(v)j ∣∣ = n µ∑
τ=1
(
µ
τ
)
κµ−τ+1(ν − κ)τ−1. (23)
7) Privacy: It is worth mentioning that the queries generated by Algorithm 1 inherently satisfy the privacy
condition of (2a), which is guaranteed by satisfying the index, message, and database symmetry principles as for
all the PIR schemes in [11], [13], [16]. We also would like to emphasize that the achievable rates of our proposed
PC schemes can be further improved by removing the redundant queries caused from the dependency among the
virtual messages. Note that this will not break the privacy condition and will be discussed together with recovery
in the following sections for each of the proposed PC schemes.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the presented generic query generation is, so far, a PIR-like
scheme from a linearly-coded DSS with dependent virtual messages representing the evaluations of the candidate
functions. In contrast to simple PIR solutions, in PC we have the opportunity to exploit the dependencies induced
by performing computations over the same set of messages, i.e., the f independent messages W(1), . . . ,W(f), while
keeping the requested index v private from each database. As shown in the recent PC literature (e.g., [17], [18],
[20]), one is able to exploit this dependency to optimize the download cost by trading communication overhead
with offline computation performed at the user side. In the following, we exploit the redundancy among the virtual
messages X(v), v ∈ [µ], to enhance the achievable rate and accordingly tailor the Q-Gen algorithm to the case of
PLC in Section VI, and to the general case of PPC in Sections VII and VIII, respectively.
VI. PRIVATE LINEAR COMPUTATION FROM CODED DSSS
One of the main results of this paper is the derivation of the PLC capacity for a coded DSS where data is encoded
and stored using a linear code from the class of MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes [16]. The problem of PLC
translates, in the PPC setup, to restricting the candidate function set to polynomials of degree g = 1. Based on
the PLC converse bound of Theorem 3, in this section we represent PLC as a special case of PPC and construct a
capacity-achieving scheme using the generic query generation algorithm of Section V. In the following Theorem 4,
we settle the PLC capacity for a DSS where data is stored using an MDS-PIR capacity-achieving code.
Theorem 4. Consider a DSS with n noncolluding databases that uses an [n, k] MDS-PIR capacity-achieving code
C to store f messages. Then, the maximum achievable PLC rate over all possible PLC protocols, i.e., the PLC
capacity CPLC, is
CPLC ,
(
1− k
n
)[
1−
(k
n
)r]−1
,
where r is the rank of the linear mapping from (5).
We remark that since all MDS codes are MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes, it follows that if rank(V) = f ,
then the PLC capacity for an MDS-coded DSS is equal to the MDS-PIR capacity CMDS-PIR [20].
In PLC, a user wishes to privately compute exactly one linear function evaluation from the µ candidate
linear functions evaluations X(1), . . . ,X(µ) from the coded DSS. With X(v) =
(
X
(v)
1 , . . . , X
(v)
L
)
, the µ-tuple(
X
(1)
l , . . . , X
(µ)
l
)T
, ∀ l ∈ [L], is mapped by (5). Hence, the user privately generates an index v ∈ [µ] and wishes
to compute the v-th linear function while keeping the index v private from each database. The capacity-achieving
PLC scheme is provided in the following subsections.
A. Query Generation for PLC
We use the generic query generation algorithm of Section V (see Algorithm 1). Given that the messages are stored
using an [n, k] MDS-PIR capacity-achieving code C , we can construct a ν×n MDS-PIR capacity-achieving matrix
ΛPIRκ,ν . This matrix is used for the generic PC achievable rate matrix Λ
PC
κ,ν , and we can obtain the PC interference
matrices Aκ×n and B(ν−κ)×n as defined in Section V-A (see Definition 8). As a result, we require the size of the
messages to be L = νµ · k (i.e., β = νµ). In PLC, (22) can simply be written as U (v′)t,j , vv′Cpi(t),j , where vv′
represents the v′-th row vector of the matrix Vµ×f = (vi,j). For the desired linear function indexed with v ∈ [µ],
the queries Q(v)j are generated by invoking Algorithm 1 from Section V-B as follows:
{Q(v)1 , . . . , Q(v)n } ← Q-Gen(v, µ, k, n, n,Ak×n,B(n−k)×n).
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B. Sign Assignment and Redundancy Elimination
Our proposed PLC scheme is further constructed with two additional procedures: sign assignment and redundancy
elimination. After running Algorithm 1, the user will know which row indices of the stored code symbols he/she is
going to request. To reduce the total number of downloaded symbols, the linear dependency among the candidate
linear functions evaluations is exploited. To this end, an initial sign σ(v)t is first privately generated by the user
with a uniform distribution over {−1,+1} for all t ∈ [β], i.e., the same selected sign is identically applied to all
symbols from different function evaluations with the same index. Next, depending on the desired linear function
index v ∈ [µ], we apply a deterministic sign assignment procedure that carefully scales each pre-signed symbol
in the query sets, i.e., σ(v)t U
(v′)
t,j , v
′ ∈ [µ], by {+1,−1}. The intuition behind the sign assignment is to introduce
a uniquely solvable equation system from the different τ -sum types given the side information available from all
other databases. By obtaining such a system of equations in each round, the user can determine some of the queries
offline to decode the desired linear function evaluations and/or interference, thus reducing the download rate. On
the other hand, the privately selected initial sign for σ(v)t , t ∈ [β], acts as a one-time pad that randomizes over
the deterministic sign assignment procedure. Here, we adopt a similar sign assignment process over each symbol
in the query sets, as introduced in [17, Sec. IV-B]. Moreover, we remark that after sign assignment, the recovery
condition of the scheme is inherently maintained since it can be seen as a coded PIR scheme as in [16]. Based on
this insight we can state the following lemma for redundancy elimination.
Lemma 3. For all v ∈ [µ], each database j ∈ [n], and based on the side information available from the databases,
any
(
µ−r
τ
)
τ -sum types out of all possible
(
µ
τ
)
types in each round τ ∈ [µ− r] of the query sets are redundant.
Since repetition codes and MDS codes are MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes, Lemma 3 generalizes both [17,
Lem. 1] and [20, Lem. 1]. The proof for Lemma 3 is based on the insight that the redundancy resulting from the
linear dependencies between virtual messages is also present with MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes. Accordingly,
the derivations of Lemma 3 are omitted for brevity. The optimality and privacy of the scheme is similar as in the
motivating example of Section III.
We now make the final modification to our PLC query sets by first directly applying the sign assignment over
σ
(v)
t U
(v′)
t,j , v
′ ∈ [µ], and then remove the τ -sums corresponding to redundant τ -sum types from every round
τ ∈ [µ− r] according Lemma 3. Note that the amount of redundancy is dependent on the rank of the functions
matrix, rank(V) = r ≤ min{µ, f}, thus generalizing the MDS-coded PLC case. Finally, we generate the queries
Q
(v)
[n] . The key idea of the scheme is illustrated in the motivating example of Section III and in Example 2 below.
Example 2. Consider four messages W(1), W(2), W(3), and W(4) that are stored in a DSS using the [4, 2] MDS-PIR
capacity-achieving code C given in Example 1 for which
ΛPIR1,2 =
(
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
)
is a PIR achievable rate matrix. According to Definition 8 we obtain the PC interference matrices A1×4 =(
1 2 1 2
)
and B1×4 =
(
2 1 2 1
)
. Suppose that the user wishes to obtain a linear function evaluation
X(v) from a set of µ = 4 candidate linear functions evaluations, whose Vµ×f from (5) is given by
V4×2 =

1 0 0 1
1 1 0 0
2 1 0 1
4 1 0 3
.
We simplify notation by letting xt,j = U
(1)
t,j , yt,j = U
(2)
t,j , zt,j = U
(3)
t,j , and wt,j = U
(4)
t,j for all t ∈ [β], j ∈ [n],
where β = νµ = 16. Let the desired linear function index be v = 1. For this example, the construction of the query
sets is briefly presented in the following steps.2
Initialization (Round τ = 1): Algorithm 1 starts with τ = 1 to generate auxiliary query sets for each database
holding κµ−1 = 1 distinct instances of xt,j . By message symmetry this also applies to yt,j , zt,j , and wt,j . The
auxiliary query sets for the first round are shown in Table III(a). Note that the queries for zt,j and wt,j can
2With some abuse of notation for the sake of simplicity, the generated queries are sets containing their answers.
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be generated offline by the user and thus are later removed from the query sets. Moreover, in Table III(a), we
highlight in red the information set indicator u ∈ [ν] as specified by the interference matrix A1×4, i.e., u = a1,j .
Using this indicator, we determine the indices of the queried symbols as seen in the algorithm Initial-Round,
i.e., Algorithm 2.
Following Rounds (τ > 1): As can be seen from Table III(b)–(d), using the PC interference matrices A1×4 and
B1×4, Algorithm 1 generates auxiliary query sets Q
(1)
j (a1,j ,D; τ) containing desired linear function evaluations to
be decoded by exploiting side information. In particular, the algorithm generated (τ − 1)-sums of side information
containing symbols from undesired linear functions evaluations based on Aκ×n in the previous round. In the
current round, it generates desired symbols as sums of a single symbol from the desired linear function evaluation
and side information based on B(ν−κ)×n. Similar to Table III(a), in Table III(b)–(d), we highlight with red the
information set indicator u = a1,j ∈ [ν]. Here, this indicator is used in determining the indices of desired linear
function evaluations in Q(1)j (a1,j ,D; τ) following the algorithm Desired-Q, i.e., Algorithm 3. In addition, we
illustrate with magenta dashed arrows the side information exploitation following the algorithm Exploit-SI,
i.e., Algorithm 4. Note that, by utilizing the code coordinates forming an information set in the code array, it can
be shown that the side information based on B(ν−κ)×n can be decoded. For example, in round 3, since {2, 4} is
an information set of the storage code C , the code symbols y6,1 + z4,1 and y6,3 + z4,3 can be obtained by knowing
y6,2 + z4,2 and y6,4 + z4,4, from which the corresponding symbols x6,1 and x6,3 can be obtained by canceling the
side information. Hence, the symbols from the desired linear function can be obtained. After generating the desired
auxiliary query sets Q(1)j (a1,j ,D; τ), the undesired auxiliary query sets Q(1)j (a1,j ,U ; τ) are generated by enforcing
message symmetry. In Table III(b)–(d), we indicate with cyan arrows the message symmetry enforcement procedure
following the algorithm M-Sym, i.e., Algorithm 5, and with red the resulting index symmetry in Q(1)j (a1,j ,U ; τ)
based on the desired linear function indices.
Finally, we apply the sign assignment process to the query sets for v = 1. The resulting queries after sign
assignment are shown in Table IV. Similar to the motivating example of Section III, Lemma 3 will be used to
remove the redundant queries from each database, and one can show that the desired linear function evaluation
X(1) can still be recovered. This completes the recovery part. For example, in round 2 and for the 1st database,
one can verify that
1(y7,1 − w3,1)− 1(y5,1 − z3,1)− (1 · 1− 3 · 1)x3,1 − 3x5,1 + 1x7,1
= 1(y7,1 − 3x3,1 − 1y3,1)− (y5,1 − x3,1 − y3,1) + 2x3,1 − 3x5,1 + x7,1
= (x7,1 + y7,1)− (3x5,1 + y5,1) = z7,1 − w5,1, (24)
and hence we do not need to download the 2-sum z7,1−w5,1. Similarly, we can do the same process for the other
databases. The redundant queries are marked in blue in Table IV and the indices t ∈ [β] of the desired linear
function evaluations are marked in red. The resulting PLC rate becomes ν
µ·k
D
= 16·212·4 =
2
3 , which is equal to the
PLC capacity in Theorem 4 with r = rank(V) = 2. This proves the optimality of the PLC scheme.
For completeness, we also show that the user’s privacy is still maintained after the removal of redundant queries,
which follows from a similar argument as in the motivating example of Section III. Here, we only need to show that
for any desired index v ∈ [4], the removed redundant τ -sums can be chosen to be of the same type. For instance,
let us consider the 1st database. In the 2nd round, see Table IV, it can be shown that the queries for desired index
v = 3 satisfy the equation
(1 · 1− 3 · 1)(x5,1 − y3,1)− 1(x7,1 − w3,1)− 3z3,1 − 1z5,1 + 1z7,1
= −2(x5,1 − y3,1)− (x7,1 − 3x3,1 − y3,1)− 3(x3,1 + y3,1)− (x5,1 + y5,1) + (x7,1 + y7,1)
= 1(y7,1 − (3x5,1 + y5,1)) = y7,1 − w5,1,
which implies that the 2-sum z7,1 − w2,1 can be removed from the download, since z7,1 can be obtained from
downloading x5,1 − y3,1, x7,1 − w3,1, x2,1 − z3,1, y2,1 − z5,1, and y7,1 − w5,1. Hence, the redundant τ -sum type
for v = 3 can be chosen to be equal to the redundant τ -sum type for v = 1 (see (24)). A similar argument can be
made for v = 2 and v = 4, which ensures the privacy of the scheme. ♦
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TABLE III: Auxiliary query sets for each round. Highlighted in red is the information set indicator u ∈ [ν] used
in determining the indices of the queried symbols. The magenta dashed arrows and the cyan arrows indicate that
the Exploit-SI algorithm and the M-Sym algorithm are used, respectively.
j 1 2 3 4
Q
(1)
j (a1,j ,D; 1) x(1−1)·1+1,1 x(2−1)·1+1,2 x(1−1)·1+1,3 x(2−1)·1+1,4
Q
(1)
j (a1,j ,U ; 1)
y(1−1)·1+1,1 y(2−1)·1+1,2 y(1−1)·1+1,3 y(2−1)·1+1,4
z(1−1)·1+1,1 z(2−1)·1+1,2 z(1−1)·1+1,3 z(2−1)·1+1,4
w(1−1)·1+1,1 w(2−1)·1+1,2 w(1−1)·1+1,3 w(2−1)·1+1,4
(a)
j 1 2 3 4
Q
(1)
j (a1,j ,D; 2)
x1·2+1,1 + y2,1 x1·2+2,2 + y1,2 x1·2+1,3 + y2,3 x1·2+2,4 + y1,4
x2·2+1,1 + z2,1 x2·2+2,2 + z1,2 x2·2+1,3 + z2,3 x2·2+2,4 + z1,4
x3·2+1,1 + w2,1 x3·2+2,2 + w1,2 x3·2+1,3 + w2,3 x3·2+2,4 + w1,4
Q
(1)
j (a1,j ,U ; 2)
y4+1,1 + z2+1,1 y4+2,2 + z2+2,2 y4+1,3 + z2+1,3 y4+2,4 + z2+2,4
y6+1,1 + w2+1,1 y6+2,2 + w2+2,2 y6+1,3 + w2+1,3 y6+2,4 + w2+2,4
z6+1,1 + w4+1,1 z6+2,2 + w4+2,2 z6+1,3 + w4+1,3 z6+2,4 + w4+2,4
(b)
j 1 2 3 4
Q
(1)
j (a1,j ,D; 3)
x4·2+1,1 + y6,1 + z4,1 x4·2+2,2 + y5,2 + z3,2 x4·2+1,3 + y6,3 + z4,3 x4·2+2,4 + y5,4 + z3,4
x5·2+1,1 + y8,1 + w4,1 x5·2+2,2 + y7,2 + w3,2 x5·2+1,3 + y8,3 + w4,3 x5·2+2,4 + y7,4 + w3,4
x6·2+1,1 + z8,1 + w6,1 x6·2+2,2 + z7,2 + w5,2 x6·2+1,3 + z8,3 + w6,3 x6·2+2,4 + z7,4 + w5,4
Q
(1)
j (a1,j ,U ; 3) y12+1,1 + z10+1,1 + w8+1,1 y12+2,2 + z10+2,2 + w8+2,2 y12+1,3 + z10+1,3 + w8+1,3 y12+2,4 + z10+2,4 + w8+2,4
(c)
j 1 2 3 4
Q
(1)
j (a1,j ,D; 4) x7·2+1,1 + y14,1 + z12,1 + w10,1 x7·2+2,2 + y13,2 + z11,2 + w9,2 x7·2+1,3 + y14,3 + z12,3 + w10,3 x7·2+2,4 + y13,4 + z11,4 + w9,4
(d)
C. Achievable PLC Rate
The resulting achievable PLC rate of Algorithm 1 after removing redundant τ -sums according to Lemma 3
becomes
R
(a)
=
kνµ
n
∑µ
τ=1
((
µ
τ
)− (µ−rτ ))κµ−(τ−1)(ν − κ)τ−1
(b)
=
κνµ
ν
∑µ
τ=1
((
µ
τ
)− (µ−rτ ))κµ−(τ−1)(ν − κ)τ−1
=
νµ
(
ν−κ
ν
)∑µ
τ=1
((
µ
τ
)− (µ−rτ ))κµ−τ (ν − κ)τ
...
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TABLE IV: The PLC query sets for v = 1 after sign assignment for rounds one to four for a coded DSS that uses
the [4, 2] code of Example 2 to store f = 4 messages. Red subscripts indicate the indices of the desired linear
function evaluation. The redundant queries are marked in blue. For the 1st database, the query sets for v = 3 are
also listed.
j 1 2 3 4
v 1 3 1 1 1
Q
(v)
j (D; 1) x1,1 z1,1 x2,2 x1,3 x2,4
Q
(v)
j (U ; 1) y1,1, z1,1, w1,1 x1,1, y1,1, w1,1 y2,2, z2,2, w2,2 y1,3, z1,3, w1,3 y2,4, z2,4, w2,4
Q
(v)
j (D; 2)
x3,1 − y2,1 x2,1 − z3,1 x4,2 − y1,2 x3,3 − y2,3 x4,4 − y1,4
x5,1 − z2,1 y2,1 − z5,1 x6,2 − z1,2 x5,3 − z2,3 x6,4 − z1,4
x7,1 − w2,1 z7,1 − w2,1 x8,2 − w1,2 x7,3 − w2,3 x8,4 − w1,4
Q
(v)
j (U ; 2)
y5,1 − z3,1 x5,1 − y3,1 y6,2 − z4,2 y5,3 − z3,3 y6,4 − z4,4
y7,1 − w3,1 x7,1 − w3,1 y8,2 − w4,2 y7,3 − w3,3 y8,4 − w4,4
z7,1 − w5,1 y7,1 − w5,1 z8,2 − w6,2 z7,3 − w5,3 z8,4 − w6,4
Q
(v)
j (D; 3)
x9,1 − y6,1 + z4,1 x6,1 − y4,1 + z9,1 x10,2 − y5,2 + z3,2 x9,3 − y6,3 + z4,3 x10,4 − y5,4 + z3,4
x11,1 − y8,1 + w4,1 −x8,1 − z11,1 + w4,1 x12,2 − y7,2 + w3,2 x11,3 − y8,3 + w4,3 x12,4 − y7,4 + w3,4
x13,1 − z8,1 + w6,1 −y8,1 − z13,1 + w6,1 x14,2 − z7,2 + w5,2 x13,3 − z8,3 + w6,3 x14,4 − z7,4 + w5,4
Q
(v)
j (U ; 3) y13,1 − z11,1 + w9,1 x13,1 − y11,1 + w9,1 y14,2 − z12,2 + w10,2 y13,3 − z11,3 + w9,3 y14,4 − z12,4 + w10,4
Q
(v)
j (D; 4) x15,1 − y14,1 + z12,1 − w10,1 x14,1 − y12,1 + z15,1 + w10,1 x16,2 − y13,2 + z11,2 − w9,2 x15,3 − y14,3 + z12,3 − w10,3 x16,4 − y13,4 + z11,4 − w9,4
(c)
=
νµ
(
1− κν
)
νµ− κrνµ−r
=
(
1− κ
ν
)[
1−
(κ
ν
)r]−1
, (25)
where we recall that
(
m
n
)
= 0 if m < n; (a) follows from the PLC rate in Definition 3, (23), and Lemma 3; (b)
follows from Definition 5; and (c) follows by adapting similar steps as in the proof given in [20] (see also the
proof of the achievable PPC rate of Theorem 5 in Section VII-E). Note that the rate in (25) matches the converse
in Theorem 3, which proves Theorem 4.
VII. A GENERAL PPC SCHEME FOR RS-CODED DSSS WITH LAGRANGE ENCODING
In the following, we build a PPC scheme based on Lagrange encoding and our PLC scheme in Section VI. Note
that a higher degree polynomial, i.e., g > 1, can be written as a linear combination of monomials, and therefore
any private monomial computation (PMC) scheme is a special case of PPC. Thus, a PPC scheme can be obtained
from a PLC scheme by replacing independent messages with a monomial basis. We first discuss the PPC case in
general and then provide an example for the special case of PMC.
In RS-coded DSSs, each message is encoded using an [n, k] RS code as follows. Each W (m)i is encoded by
an RS code RSk(α) with evaluation vector α = (α1, . . . , αn) over Fq into a length-n codeword C(m)i where
C
(m)
i = W
(m)
i GRSk(α,γ) =
(
C
(m)
i,1 , . . . , C
(m)
i,n
)
and C(m)i,j = `(αj), j ∈ [n]. Consider an RS-coded DSS with
n noncolluding databases storing f messages. The user wishes to retrieve the evaluation of the v-th polynomial
function X(v), v ∈ [µ], from the available information from queries Q(v)j and answer strings A(v)j , j ∈ [n], satisfying
the conditions of (2a) and (2b).
A. Lagrange Coded Computation
Lagrange coded computation [26] is a framework that can be applied to any function computation when the
function of interest is a multivariate polynomial of the messages. We extend the application of this framework to
PMC and PPC by utilizing the following argument.
Let `(m)t (z) be the Lagrange interpolation polynomial associated with the length-k message segment W
(m)
t
for some t ∈ [β] and m ∈ [f ]. Recall that `(m)t (z) evaluated at γj results in an information symbol W (m)t,j
and when evaluated at αj we obtain a code symbol C
(m)
t,j . Let `t(z) = (`
(1)
t (z), . . . , `
(f)
t (z)) be a vector of
f Lagrange interpolation polynomials associated with the messages W (1)t , . . . ,W
(f)
t . Now, given a multivariate
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polynomial function φ(Wt,j) of degree at most g, we introduce the composition function ψt(z) = φ(`t(z)).
Accordingly, evaluating ψt(z) at any γj , j ∈ [k], is equal to evaluating the polynomial function over the uncoded
information symbols, i.e., φ(Wt,j) and similarly, evaluating ψt(z) at αj , j ∈ [n], will result in the evaluation of the
polynomial function over the coded symbols, i.e., φ(Ct,j). Since each Lagrange interpolation polynomial of `t(z)
is a polynomial of degree at most k− 1, it follows that deg(ψt(z)) ≤ g(k− 1) and we require up to g(k− 1) + 1
coefficients to interpolate and determine the polynomial ψt(z).
Note that ψt(z) is a linear combination of monomials zi ∈ Fq[z], i ≤ g(k − 1), and the underlying code C˜ for
(ψt(α1), . . . , ψt(αn)), referred to as the polynomial decoding code, is given by the g-fold star-product RS?gk (α) of
the storage code RSk(α) according to [22, Lem. 6]. This is due to the fact that the span of RS?gk (α) is given by
linear combinations of codewords in RS?gk (α) where each code symbol represents a monomial. With other words,
to construct coded PPC schemes that retrieve polynomials of degree at most g, we require g(k − 1) + 1 ≤ n and
dC˜min ≥ n−(g(k−1)+1)+1, where dC˜min denotes the minimum distance of C˜ , to be able to decode the computation
correctly. It follows from Proposition 1 that C˜ = RS k˜(α) with dimension k˜ = min{g(k−1)+1, n} = g(k−1)+1
and dC˜min = n− k˜ + 1 = n− (g(k − 1) + 1) + 1.
B. PPC Achievable Rate Matrix
We now specialize the definition of a generic PC achievable rate matrix from Definition 7 to the coded PPC
problem as follows.
Definition 11. Let C be an arbitrary [n, k] code and denote by C˜ = C ?g the k˜-dimensional code generated by the
g-fold star-product of C with itself. A ν×n binary matrix ΛPPCκ,ν is called a PPC achievable rate matrix for (C , C˜ ),
if it is a generic PC achievable rate matrix with κν =
k˜
n , and for each row λi, χ(λi) is always an information set
for C˜ , i ∈ [ν].
Similar to the PLC scheme presented in Section VI-A, the resulting PPC scheme requires the length of each
message to be L = νµ · k. The queries Q(v)j are generated by setting (κ, ν) = (k˜, n) and invoking Algorithm 1
from Section V as follows:
{Q(v)1 , . . . , Q(v)n } ← Q-Gen(v, µ, k˜, n, n,Ak˜×n,B(n−k˜)×n).
C. Sign Assignment and Redundancy Elimination
Here, we generalize the coded PLC scheme of Section VI in terms of exploiting the dependency between the
virtual messages. Since any polynomial is a linear function of the monomial basis of size M(f, g), a PPC scheme
can be seen as a PLC scheme performed over a set of M(f, g) messages. Hence, the redundancy resulting from
the linear dependencies between the virtual messages is also present for PPC and we can extend Lemma 3 and [17,
Lem. 1] to this scheme. To exploit the dependency between the virtual messages we adopt a similar sign assignment
process to each queried symbol of the virtual monomial messages as mentioned in Section VI-B. Using Lagrange
interpolation, we will show that it results in a uniquely solvable equation system from the different τ -sum types
given the side information available from all other databases. By obtaining such a system of equations in each
round τ ∈ [µ] of the protocol, the user can determine some of the answers offline.
Now, consider τ -sum types for τ = 1, where we download individual segments of each virtual message including
f independent messages. For this type, the user can determine any polynomial from the f obtained message
segments. Based on this insight we can state the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Let µ ∈ [f : µ(f, g)] be the number of candidate polynomial functions evaluations, including the f
independent messages. For each query set, for all v ∈ [µ], each database j ∈ [n], and based on the queried
segments from the f independent messages, any
(
µ−f
1
)
1-sum types out of all possible types
(
µ
1
)
are redundant.
On the other hand, for τ ∈ [2 : µ], any (max{µ−M(f,g),0}τ ) τ -sum types out of (µτ) types are redundant. Thus, the
number of nonredundant τ -sum types with τ > 1 is given by ρ(µ, τ) ,
(
µ
τ
)− (max{µ−M(f,g),0}τ ).
In the next subsection, we show that the privacy and recovery conditions of our proposed PPC scheme are
satisfied.
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D. Recovery and Privacy
The scheme works as the PLC scheme in Section VI using the code C˜ instead of the storage code C . This
is the case since for any polynomial evaluation code D , D∗i ⊆ D∗j for all i ∈ [j], j ∈ N, since the all-ones
codeword is in D (see also [22, Lem. 6]). Moreover, since the definition of the PPC achievable rate matrix in
Definition 11 is analogous to the corresponding definition of a PIR achievable rate matrix in Definition 4 (by using
C˜ instead of C ), it can directly be seen that the arguments in the proof of [16, Thm. 1] (see [16, App. B]) can
be applied. Hence, it follows that k˜ distinct evaluations of ψt(z) = φ(`t(z)) for each segment t can be recovered.
Since deg(ψt(z)) ≤ k˜ − 1, it follows that the polynomial ψt(z) can be reconstructed via polynomial interpolation
and then the desired polynomial functions evaluations can be recovered by evaluating ψt(z) at γj , j ∈ [k], which
is equal to evaluating the desired polynomial φ(·) over the uncoded information symbols, i.e., φ(Wt,j) due to
Lagrange encoding.
As for the privacy of the PPC scheme, using an argumentation similar to the PLC scheme, it can be seen that
for any desired index v ∈ [µ], the redundant τ -sum types according to Lemma 4 can be fixed, i.e., the same τ -sum
types are redundant for all v ∈ [µ], and hence the queries satisfy the privacy condition. See also Example 3 below
which illustrates that the privacy and recovery conditions are indeed satisfied.
E. Achievable PPC Rate
Since C˜ is an [n, k˜] MDS code (C is an RS code), there always exists a PPC achievable rate matrix ΛPPCκ,ν with
κ
ν =
k˜
n . Hence, using Lemma 4 we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Consider a DSS that uses an [n, k] RS code C to store f messages over n noncolluding databases
using Lagrange encoding. Let µ ∈ [f : µ(f, g)] be the number of candidate polynomial functions evaluations of
degree at most g, including the f independent messages. Then, the PPC rate
RPPC =

1
f Hmin if n ≤ g(k − 1) + 1,
k
k˜
(
1− k˜n
)
Hmin
1−
(
k˜
n
)min{µ,M(f,g)}−(min{µ,M(f,g)}−f)(1− k˜n)( k˜n)µ−1 otherwise (26)
is achievable.
Proof: From (23) and Lemma 4, the achievable PPC rate after removing redundant τ -sums becomes
R
(a)
=
kνµHmin
n
((
µ
1
)− (µ−f1 ))κµ + n∑µτ=2 ρ(µ, τ)κµ−τ+1(ν − κ)τ−1
=
kνµHmin
n
[
fκµ +
∑µ
τ=2 ρ(µ, τ)κ
µ−τ+1(ν − κ)τ−1
] , (27)
where (a) follows from the PPC rate in Definition 3, (23), and Lemma 4. Now, if ν = κ, or equivalently (from
Definition 11) n = k˜
(b)
= min{g(k − 1) + 1, n}, i.e., n = g(k − 1) + 1 (since n cannot be strictly smaller than
g(k − 1) + 1 by assumption and (b) is from Proposition 1), then it follows directly from (27) that R = knf Hmin.
Moreover, in can be seen in this case that the proposed scheme reduces to the trivial scheme where the f independent
files are downloaded and then the desired function evaluation is performed offline. However, the proposed scheme
requires an unnecessarily high redundancy to decode the f files, i.e., k˜ = n instead of k˜ = k. As a result, for
the case of n ≤ g(k − 1) + 1, we opt out of any other achievable scheme and achieve the PPC rate 1f Hmin by
simply downloading all f files and performing the desired function evaluation offline. Otherwise, i.e., ν > κ, or
equivalently (from Definition 11), n > k˜ = min{g(k − 1) + 1, n}, i.e., n > g(k − 1) + 1, then from (27) we have
R
(c)
=
k(ν − κ)Hmin
nκ
[
f(ν − κ)
ν
(κ
ν
)µ−1
+
1
νµ
µ∑
τ=2
ρ(µ, τ)κµ−τ (ν − κ)τ
]−1
(d)
=
kHmin
n
(n
k˜
− 1
)[
f
(
1− k˜
n
)( k˜
n
)µ−1
+
1
nµ
µ∑
τ=2
((
µ
τ
)
−
(
max{µ−M(f, g), 0}
τ
))
k˜
µ−τ
(n− k˜)τ
]−1
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=
kHmin
k˜
(
1− k˜
n
)[
f
(
1− k˜
n
)( k˜
n
)µ−1
+
1
nµ
(
µ∑
τ=0
(
µ
τ
)
k˜
µ−τ
(n− k˜)τ − µk˜µ−1(n− k˜)− k˜µ
)
− 1
nµ
µ∑
τ=2
(
max{µ−M(f, g), 0}
τ
)
k˜
µ−τ
(n− k˜)τ
]−1
(e)
=
kHmin
k˜
(
1− k˜
n
)[
f
(
1− k˜
n
)( k˜
n
)µ−1
+
1
nµ
(
nµ − µk˜µ−1(n− k˜)− k˜µ
)
− 1
nµ
(
η∑
τ=0
(
η
τ
)
k˜
µ−τ
(n− k˜)τ − ηk˜µ−1(n− k˜)− k˜µ
)]−1
=
kHmin
k˜
(
1− k˜
n
)[
f
(
1− k˜
n
)( k˜
n
)µ−1
+ 1− µ
(
1− k˜
n
)( k˜
n
)µ−1
−
( k˜
n
)µ
− 1
nµ
(
k˜
µ−η
η∑
τ=0
(
η
τ
)
k˜
η−τ
(n− k˜)τ
)
+ η
(
1− k˜
n
)( k˜
n
)µ−1
+
( k˜
n
)µ]−1
=
kHmin
k˜
(
1− k˜
n
)[
1 + (f − µ+ η)
(
1− k˜
n
)( k˜
n
)µ−1
− 1
nµ
(
k˜
µ−η
nη
)]−1
=
kHmin
k˜
(
1− k˜
n
)[
1− (µ− η − f)(1− k˜
n
)( k˜
n
)µ−1
−
( k˜
n
)µ−η]−1
=
k
k˜
(
1− k˜n
)
Hmin
1− ( k˜n)min{µ,M(f,g)} − (min{µ,M(f, g)} − f)(1− k˜n)( k˜n)µ−1 ,
where (c) follows since ν > κ; (d) holds since we have κν =
k˜
n from Definition 11; and (e) follows by defining
η , max{µ−M(f, g), 0} and the fact that (mn) = 0 if m < n.
Corollary 1. Consider a DSS that uses an [n, k] RS code C to store f messages over n noncolluding databases
using Lagrange encoding. Let µ ∈ [f : µ(f, g)] be the number of candidate polynomial functions evaluations of
degree at most g, including the f independent messages. Then, the PPC rate
RPPC,∞ =
k
n
(
max{n− g(k − 1)− 1, 0}
g(k − 1) + 1
)
Hmin (28)
is achievable as f →∞.
Proof: If n ≤ g(k − 1) + 1, then it follows from (26) that the PPC rate approaches zero as f → ∞, which
is in accordance with (28). Otherwise, if n > g(k − 1) + 1, the result follows directly from (26) by taking the
limit f → ∞ and using the fact that k˜ (a)= min{g(k − 1) + 1, n} = g(k − 1) + 1 < n, where (a) follows from
Proposition 1.
Note that the asymptotic PPC rate in (28) is equal to the rate of the general scheme from [22] when Hmin = 1.
This difference is due to the simplified rate definition used in [22]. Moreover, our proposed scheme cannot readily
be obtained using the concept of refinement and lifting of so-called one-shot schemes as introduced for PIR in
[29], since this concept cannot readily be applied to the function computation case.
F. Special Case: PMC Scheme
As the rate of PMC is a decreasing function of the number of candidate monomial functions, we can increase
the PMC rate by limiting ourselves to the set of monomials excluding parallel monomials, where we define a
parallel monomial as a monomial resulting from raising another monomial to a positive integer power, i.e., to
{W i : i ∈ Nf0 , 1 ≤ wt(i) ≤ g, i | p, p ∈ Pg}, where Pg denotes the set of prime numbers less or equal to g and
i = (i1, . . . , if ) | p means that all nonzero ij , j ∈ [f ], are divisors of p. For example, for a bivariate monomial
over the variables x and y of degree at most g = 2 the set of possible monomials is {x, y, xy, x2, y2}. Note that
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x2 is a parallel monomial as it can be obtained by raising the monomial x to the power of 2. Thus, x2 and y2 are
parallel monomials and can be excluded from the set of candidate monomials. Denote by P = {p1, . . . , p|P|} an
arbitrary nonempty subset of Pg. By applying the Legendre formula for counting the prime numbers less or equal
to g, we obtain the number of nonparallel monomials as
ĂM(f, g) = (g + f
g
)
− 1 +
∑
∀P⊆Pg:P6=∅,
p1···p|P|≤g
(−1)|P|

⌊
g
p1···p|P|
⌋
+ f⌊
g
p1···p|P|
⌋
− 1
.
We illustrate the key concept of our proposed scheme in Theorem 5 with an example.
Example 3. Consider two messages W(1) and W(2) that are stored in a noncolluding DSS using a [4, 2] RS
code C . Suppose that the user wishes to obtain a monomial function evaluation X(v) from the set of nonparallel
monomial functions of degree at most g = 2. We have µ = ĂM(2, 2) = 3, v ∈ [3], and the candidate set of monomial
functions evaluations is {W(1),W(2),W(1)?W(2)}, where ? denotes element-wise multiplication. Let the desired
monomial function index be v = 1, i.e., the user wishes to obtain the function evaluation X(1) = W(1). We have
k˜ = g(k − 1) + 1 = 3 and
ΛPPC3,4 =

1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1

is a valid PPC achievable rate matrix for (C , C˜ ). From ΛPPC3,4 we further obtain the PC interference matrices
A3×4 =
1 1 1 22 2 3 3
3 4 4 4
 and B1×4 = (4 3 2 1)
from Definition 8.
We simplify notation by letting xt,j = C
(1)
t,j , yt,j = C
(2)
t,j , and zt,j = C
(1)
t,j · C(2)t,j for all t ∈ [β], j ∈ [n], where
β = νµ = 64. Since the desired function evaluation is X(1), the goal is to privately obtain xt,j , t ∈ [β], and
successfully decode X(1). The construction of the query sets is briefly presented in the following steps.3
Initialization (Round τ = 1): We start with τ = 1 to generate query sets for each database j holding κµ = 27
distinct instances of xt,j . By message symmetry this also applies to yt,j and zt,j .
Following Rounds (τ ∈ [2 : 3]): Using the PC interference matrices A3×4 and B1×4 for the exploitation of side
information for the j-th database, j ∈ [n], we generate the desired query sets Q(1)j (D; τ) by querying a number of
new symbols of the desired monomial jointly combined with symbols from other monomials queried in the previous
round from database i 6= j. Next, the undesired query sets Q(1)j (U ; τ) (if τ = 2) are generated by enforcing message
symmetry.
In the end, we we apply the sign assignment procedure to the query sets for v = 1 and make the final modification
to the queries by removing all redundant 1-sum types from the first round (see Lemma 4). This translates to
removing the queries for zt,j , since they can be generated offline by the user given xt,j and yt,j . The resulting
query sets are shown in Table V, where ua:b,j , {ua,j , . . . , ub,j} for u = x, y, z, and the side information is
highlighted with blue and red for rounds τ = 2 and τ = 3, respectively. Similar to Example 2, by using Lagrange
interpolation, it can be shown that the side information based on B(ν−κ)×n can be decoded. For instance, in
round 2, since y1:3,1, y1:3,2, y1:3,3 obtained from round 1 are enough to reconstruct the associated Lagrange
interpolation polynomial, the side information y1:3,4 can be obtained, from which the desired polynomial function
evaluations x43:45,4 can be decoded by side information cancellation. Note that in this example, it is clear that
zt,j is redundant, no matter which v is requested, and hence privacy is ensured. The PMC rate of the scheme is
equal to kν
µHmin
D
= 2×4
3
3×4×28 Hmin = 0.3810 ·Hmin, where the value of Hmin = H(X(3)) depends on the underlying
field. ♦
3With some abuse of notation for the sake of simplicity, the generated queries are sets containing their answers.
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TABLE V: The PMC query sets for v = 1 after sign assignment and removal of redundant queries for a [4, 2]
RS-coded DSS with Lagrange encoding storing f = 2 messages, where the µ = 3 candidate monomial functions
evaluations are {X(1) = W(1),X(2) = W(2),X(3) = W(1)?W(2)}. Blue and red subscripts indicate side information
exploitation in rounds τ = 2 and τ = 3, respectively.
j 1 2 3 4
Q
(1)
j (D; 1) x1:9,1, x10:18,1, x19:27,1 x1:9,2, x10:18,2, x28:36,2 x1:9,3, x19:27,3, x28:36,3 x10:18,4, x19:27,4, x28:36,4
Q
(1)
j (U ; 1) y1:9,1, y10:18,1, y19:27,1 y1:9,2, y10:18,2, y28:36,2 y1:9,3, y19:27,3, y28:36,3 y10:18,2, y19:27,3, y28:36,4
Q
(1)
j (D; 2)
x37:39,1 − y28:30,1 x37:39,2 − y19:21,2 x37:39,3 − y10:12,3 x43:45,4 − y1:3,4
x40:42,1 − z28:30,1 x40:42,2 − z19:21,2 x40:42,3 − z10:12,3 x46:48,4 − z1:3,4
x43:45,1 − y31:33,1 x43:45,2 − y22:24,2 x49:51,3 − y13:15,3 x49:51,4 − y4:6,4
x46:48,1 − z31:33,1 x46:48,2 − z22:24,2 x52:54,3 − z13:15,3 x52:54,4 − z4:6,4
x49:51,1 − y34:36,1 x55:57,2 − y25:27,2 x55:57,3 − y16:18,3 x55:57,4 − y7:9,4
x52:54,1 − z34:36,1 x58:60,2 − z25:27,2 x58:60,3 − z16:18,3 x58:60,4 − z7:9,4
Q
(1)
j (U ; 2)
y40:42,1 − z37:39,1 y40:42,2 − z37:39,2 y40:42,3 − z37:39,3 y46:48,4 − z43:45,4
y46:48,1 − z43:45,1 y46:48,2 − z43:45,2 y52:54,3 − z49:51,3 y52:54,4 − z49:51,4
y52:54,1 − z49:51,1 y58:60,2 − z55:57,2 y58:60,3 − z55:57,3 y58:60,4 − z55:57,4
Q
(1)
j (D; 3)
x61,1 − y58,1 + z55,1 x61,2 − y52,2 + z49,2 x61,3 − y46,3 + z43,3 x62,4 − y40,4 + z37,4
x62,1 − y59,1 + z56,1 x62,2 − y53,2 + z50,2 x63,3 − y47,3 + z44,3 x63,4 − y41,4 + z38,4
x63,1 − y60,1 + z57,1 x64,2 − y54,2 + z51,2 x64,3 − y48,3 + z45,3 x64,4 − y42,4 + z39,4
VIII. PPC SCHEME FOR RS-CODED DSSS WITH SYSTEMATIC LAGRANGE ENCODING
In this section, we consider the case of RS-coded DSSs with systematic Lagrange encoding and first specialize
the definition of a generic PC achievable rate matrix from Definition 7 to this scenario.
A. PPC Systematic Achievable Rate Matrix
In contrast to the PPC scheme in Section VII, the basic idea is to utilize the systematic part of the RS code to
recover the requested function evaluation directly, i.e., we do not need to interpolate the systematic downloaded
symbols to determine the requested function evaluation. Thus, we can further enhance the download rate. However,
due to the generic PC query design principles, namely, message symmetry and side information exploitation, we
are restricted in how to exploit side information obtained from the systematic nodes. Specifically, for decodability
(side information cancellation) to be possible, the side information obtained from the systematic nodes must be
utilized in an isolated manner within an information set of the polynomial decoding code (see Section VII-A), such
that we can reverse the order of the decoding procedure (i.e., unlike our RS-coded PPC scheme, we interpolate
first and then cancel the side information). This restriction is further illustrated by a careful construction of a PPC
systematic achievable rate matrix (Definition 12 below) and the corresponding interference matrices. Moreover, we
modify the general PPC scheme to utilize only the necessary number of nodes, denoted by nˆ, that guarantee the
isolated use of systematic side information. Accordingly, we specialize Definition 7 as follows.
Definition 12. Let C be an arbitrary [n, k] code and denote by C˜ = C ?g the k˜-dimensional code generated by
the g-fold star-product of C with itself. Moreover, let4
nˆ ,

n if
⌊
n
k˜
⌋
= 1 and n− ⌊n
k˜
⌋
k˜ < k,
k + (
⌊
n
k˜
⌋− 1)k˜ if ⌊n
k˜
⌋
> 1 and n− ⌊n
k˜
⌋
k˜ < k,
k +
⌊
n
k˜
⌋
k˜ if
⌊
n
k˜
⌋ ≥ 1 and n− ⌊n
k˜
⌋
k˜ ≥ k.
(29)
4Note that the first requirement of the final case of (29) is unnecessary as
⌊
n
k˜
⌋ ≥ 1 always. However, it is included for symmetry reasons.
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Then, a ν × nˆ binary matrix ΛS,PPCκ,ν is called a PPC systematic achievable rate matrix for (C , C˜ ) if the following
conditions are satisfied.
1) ΛS,PPCκ,ν is a κ-column regular matrix, and
2) there are exactly % ,
⌊
nˆ
k˜
⌋
κ rows {λi}i∈[%] and ν−% rows {λi+%}i∈[ν−%] of ΛS,PPCκ,ν such that ∀ i ∈ [%], χ(λi)
contains an information set for C˜ and ∀ i ∈ [ν − %], χ(λi+%) = [k].
The following lemma shows how to construct a PPC systematic achievable rate matrix with (κ, ν) =
(
k, nˆ −⌊
nˆ
k˜
⌋
(k˜ − k)).
Lemma 5. Let C be an arbitrary [n, k] code and C˜ = C ?g. Then, there exists a PPC systematic achievable rate
matrix ΛS,PPCκ,ν for (C , C˜ ) with (κ, ν) =
(
k, nˆ− ⌊ nˆ
k˜
⌋
(k˜ − k)), where k˜ is the dimension of C˜ .
Proof: Let δˆ ,
⌊
nˆ
k˜
⌋
and Γ , nˆ − δˆk˜. From our choices of nˆ in (29), one can verify that Γ ≤ k and Γ is
well-defined. Accordingly, construct a matrix Ak×nˆ as in Definition 8 with
ai,j = δˆk + i, if j ∈ [k], i ∈ [Γ]. (30)
In this way, kΓ entries of Ak×nˆ are filled. Next, let {ai(j)1 ,j , . . . , ai(j)u(j),j}, j ∈ [nˆ], denote the remaining empty entries
in column j of Ak×nˆ, where u(j) ≤ k is the number of empty entries in column j. Hence, the knˆ−kΓ = k(nˆ−Γ)
entries {
a
i
(1)
1 ,1
, . . . , a
i
(1)
u(1)
,1
, . . . , a
i
(nˆ)
1 ,nˆ
, . . . , a
i
(nˆ)
u(nˆ)
,nˆ
}
(31)
are empty. Now, observe that (nˆ− Γ)δˆ−1 = (nˆ− (nˆ− δˆk˜))δˆ−1 = k˜ ∈ N. By consecutively assigning {1, . . . , δˆk}
to the entries of Ak×nˆ in (31) and repeating this process k˜ times, the remaining δˆk · nˆ−Γδˆ = k(nˆ−Γ) empty entries
of Ak×nˆ are filled. Note that since values of [δˆk] are consecutively assigned, the largest number of empty entries of
each column of Ak×nˆ is k, and δˆ =
⌊
nˆ
k˜
⌋ ≥ 1, there are no repeated values of [δˆk] in any column of Ak×nˆ, which
implies that condition 1) in Definition 12 is satisfied. From (30) and (31), it can be seen that each a ∈ [δˆk] = [%]
occurs in k˜ columns of Ak×nˆ and each a ∈ [δˆk + 1 : δˆk + Γ] occurs in k columns of Ak×nˆ. This implies that
condition 2) in Definition 12 is satisfied with κ = k, % = δˆk, and ν = Γ + δˆk, which completes the proof.
Lemma 6. It holds that
ν =

n− k˜ + k if ⌊n
k˜
⌋
= 1 and n− ⌊n
k˜
⌋
k˜ < k,⌊
n
k˜
⌋
k if
⌊
n
k˜
⌋
> 1 and n− ⌊n
k˜
⌋
k˜ < k,⌊
n
k˜
⌋
k + k if
⌊
n
k˜
⌋ ≥ 1 and n− ⌊n
k˜
⌋
k˜ ≥ k.
(32)
Proof: To prove the results, we use Definition 12 and the fact that ν = nˆ− ⌊ nˆ
k˜
⌋
(k˜− k). Now, if ⌊n
k˜
⌋
= 1 and
n−⌊n
k˜
⌋
k˜ < k (the first case from Definition 12), then it follows directly that ν = nˆ−⌊ nˆ
k˜
⌋
(k˜−k) = n−⌊n
k˜
⌋
(k˜−k) =
n − k˜ + k. On the other hand, if ⌊n
k˜
⌋
> 1 and n − ⌊n
k˜
⌋
k˜ < k (the second case from Definition 12), then after
inserting nˆ = k +
(⌊
n
k˜
⌋− 1)k˜ into the expression for ν, ν = k⌊n
k˜
⌋− ⌊k
k˜
⌋
(k˜ − k) = k⌊n
k˜
⌋
, since
⌊
k
k˜
⌋
(k˜ − k) = 0.
In a similar manner, the remaining case in (32) can be shown.
In the following lemma, we show a lower bound to the fraction κν .
Lemma 7. If a matrix ΛS,PPCκ,ν (C , C˜ ) exists for an [n, k] code C and the [n, k˜] code C˜ , then we have
κ
ν
≥ k
nˆ− ⌊ nˆ
k˜
⌋
(k˜ − k) .
Proof: Since by definition each row λi of ΛS,PPCκ,ν contains an information set for C˜ , i ∈ [%], % =
⌊
nˆ
k˜
⌋
κ, and
each row λi+% = [k], i ∈ [ν−%], we have wH(λi) ≥ k˜, i ∈ [%], and wH(λi+%) = k, i ∈ [ν−%]. Let vj , j ∈ [nˆ], be
the j-th column of ΛS,PPCκ,ν . If we look at Λ
S,PPC
κ,ν from both a row-wise and a column-wise point of view, we obtain
%k˜ + (ν − %)k ≤
%∑
i=1
wH(λi) +
ν−%∑
i=1
wH(λi+%) =
nˆ∑
j=1
wH(vj) = κnˆ.
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Thus, we have
%k˜ − %k + νk = %(k˜ − k) + νk ≤ κnˆ,
from which the result follows.
Now, similar to the PLC scheme presented in Section VI-A, the systematic PPC scheme requires the length of
each message to be L = νµ ·k. The queries Q(v)j are generated by setting (κ, ν) = (k, nˆ−
⌊
nˆ
k˜
⌋
(k˜−k)) and invoking
Algorithm 1 from Section V as follows:
{Q(v)1 , . . . , Q(v)nˆ } ← Q-Gen(v, µ, κ, ν, nˆ,Aκ×nˆ,B(ν−κ)×nˆ).
Note that we utilize nˆ ≤ n databases, including the systematic nodes, in constructing the scheme, while the
remaining n− nˆ databases are not queried.
B. Sign Assignment and Redundancy Elimination
Since this scheme is a modified version of the general PPC scheme where we utilize the systematic part of the
RS code to recover the requested function evaluation directly, the scheme inherently extend the same redundancy
and sign assignment arguments stated in Section VII-C. The only difference between the general PPC scheme and
the systematic PPC scheme lies within the following recovery argument.
C. Recovery and Privacy
The scheme works as the PPC scheme in Section VI, however by mixing between the code C˜ and the storage
code C . Due to this mixture, we require a more complicated decoding process. The key idea of the scheme is
illustrated in Example 4 below.
Example 4. Consider the same scenario as in Example 3 where n = 4, k = 2, and k˜ = 3. It follows that nˆ = n = 4,
ν = nˆ− ⌊ nˆ
k˜
⌋
(k˜ − k) = 3, κ = k = 2, % = ⌊ nˆ
k˜
⌋
κ = 2, and
ΛS,PPC2,3 =
1 0 1 10 1 1 1
1 1 0 0

is a valid PPC systematic achievable rate matrix (see Lemma 5). We further obtain the PC interference matrices
A2×4 =
(
1 2 1 1
3 3 2 2
)
and B1×4 =
(
2 1 3 3
)
from ΛS,PPC2,3 using Definition 8. For the desired function evaluation X
(1), i.e., v = 1, and µ = 3 candidate monomial
functions evaluations, the resulting query sets are shown in Table VI. Here, similar to Example 3, we deploy the
simplified notation xt,j = C
(1)
t,j , yt,j = C
(2)
t,j , and zt,j = C
(1)
t,j · C(2)t,j for all t ∈ [64], j ∈ [5], where ua:b,j ,
{ua,j , . . . , ub,j} for u = x, y, z. The PMC rate kνµHminD = 2×3
3
2×4×15 Hmin = 0.45 · Hmin is achievable, where the
value of Hmin = H(X
(3)) depends on the underlying field.5
Now we show that the L = kνµ = 54 symbols of the desired function evaluation can be reliably decoded.
Note that here we assume that the nodes j ∈ {1, 2} are systematic. The goal is to obtain all the desired function
evaluation symbols, i.e., the function evaluation symbols for j ∈ {1, 2}.
Initialization (Round τ = 1): The following steps are taken.
1) Obtain the desired symbols: From the answers retrieved for the query sets Q(1)j (D, 1), utilize the information
sets I˜1 = {1, 3, 4} and I˜2 = {2, 3, 4} of C˜ to decode the symbols of the desired function evaluation X(1)
for j ∈ {1, 2}. In other words, from x1:4,1, x1:4,3, and x1:4,4 we use Lagrange interpolation to obtain x1:4,2.
Similarly, from x5:8,2, x5:8,3, and x5:8,4 we obtain x5:8,1. Finally, from the information set I = {1, 2} of C
we readily have x9:12,1 and x9:12,2. By the end of this round, we have obtained kν(κµ−1) = 24 symbols from
the desired function evaluation X(1).
5With some abuse of notation for the sake of simplicity, the generated queries are sets containing their answers.
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TABLE VI: PMC query sets for v = 1 after sign assignment and removal of redundant queries for a [4, 2] RS-coded
DSS with systematic Lagrange encoding storing f = 2 messages, where the µ = 3 candidate monomial functions
evaluations are {X(1) = W(1),X(2) = W(2),X(3) = W(1)?W(2)}. Blue and red subscripts indicate side information
exploitation in rounds τ = 2 and τ = 3, respectively.
j 1 2 3 4
Q
(1)
j (D; 1) x1:4,1, x9:12,1 x5:8,2, x9:12,2 x1:4,3, x5:8,3 x1:4,4, x5:8,4
Q
(1)
j (U ; 1) y1:4,1, y9:12,1 y5:8,2, y9:12,2 y1:4,3, y5:8,3 y1:4,4, y5:8,4
Q
(1)
j (D; 2)
x13:14,1 − y5:6,1 x17:18,2 − y1:2,2 x13:14,3 − y9:10,3 x13:14,4 − y9:10,4
x15:16,1 − z5:6,1 x19:20,2 − z1:2,2 x15:16,3 − z9:10,3 x15:16,4 − z9:10,4
x21:22,1 − y7:8,1 x21:22,2 − y3:4,2 x17:18,3 − y11:12,3 x17:18,4 − y11:12,4
x23:24,1 − z7:8,1 x23:24,2 − z3:4,2 x19:20,3 − z11:12,3 x19:20,4 − z11:12,4
Q
(1)
j (U ; 2)
y15:16,1 − z13:14,1 y19:20,2 − z17:18,2 y15:16,3 − z13:14,3 y15:16,4 − z13:14,4
y23:24,1 − z21:22,1 y23:24,2 − z21:22,2 y19:20,3 − z17:18,3 y19:20,4 − z17:18,4
Q
(1)
j (D; 3)
x25,1 − y19,1 + z17,1 x26,2 − y15,2 + z13,2 x25,3 − y23,3 + z21,3 x25,4 − y23,4 + z21,4
x27,1 − y20,1 + z18,1 x27,2 − y16,2 + z14,2 x26,3 − y24,3 + z22,3 x26,4 − y24,4 + z22,4
2) Prepare the side information: We prepare the side information symbols retrieved in this round to be used
in the next round by the following steps. First, for the answers of the query sets Q(1)j (U , 1), repeat the
previous step to decode the undesired symbols y5:8,1 and y1:4,2. Next, since in this round, due to redundancy
elimination, we retrieve symbols of polynomials of degree one, i.e., symbols from the f = 2 independent files,
we can use Lagrange interpolation with k = 2 symbols from the systematic nodes to obtain coded symbols
for j /∈ {1, 2}. Accordingly, from x9:12,1 and x9:12,2 we obtain x9:12,3 and x9:12,4. Similarly for y9:12,3 and
y9:12,4. Finally, using the dependency between x, y, and z and the available symbols, compute z5:8,1, z1:4,2,
z9:12,3, and z9:12,4. The obtained symbols are shown in Table VII–(a).
TABLE VII: Decoded and computed symbols from the PMC query sets for v = 1 from Table VI.
j 1 2 3 4
Q˜
(1)
j (D; 1) x5:8,1 x1:4,2 x9:12,3 x9:12,4
Q˜
(1)
j (U ; 1) y5:8,1, z5:8,1 y1:4,2, z1:4,2 y9:12,3, z9:12,3 y9:12,4, z9:12,4
(a)
j 1 2
Q˜
(1)
j (D; 2) x17:18,1, x19:20,1 x13:14,2, x15:16,2
Q˜
(1)
j (U ; 2) y19:20,1 − z17:18,1 y15:16,2 − z13:14,2
(b)
j 1 2
Q˜
(1)
j (D; 3) x25,1, x27,1 x26,2, x27,2
Q˜
(1)
j (U ; 3) x25,1 + y23,1 − z21,1 x26,2 + y24,2 − z22,2
(c)
Second Round (τ = 2): The decoding procedure is as follows.
1) Interference cancellation: Utilize the decoded symbols from the set Q˜(1)j (U , 1) of Table VII–(a) to cancel the
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side information, marked in blue in Table VI, from the answers of the query sets Q(1)j (D, 2).
2) Obtain the desired symbols: Similar to the first round, utilize the information sets I˜1 = {1, 3, 4} and I˜2 =
{2, 3, 4} of C˜ to decode the symbols of the desired function evaluation X(1) for j ∈ {1, 2} shown in Q˜(1)j (D, 2)
of Table VII–(b). Together with the symbols directly obtained from j ∈ {1, 2}, by the end of this round, we
have obtained an additional kν(
(
µ−1
τ−1
)
κµ−τ (ν − κ)τ−1) = 24 symbols from the desired function evaluation.
3) Prepare the side information: We prepare the side information τ -sums retrieved in this round to be used
in the next round by repeating the previous step to decode the undesired τ -sums y19:20,1 − z17:18,1 and
y15:16,2−z13:14,2 of the query sets Q˜(1)j (U , 2). Note that, unlike in the previous round, we do not have enough
symbols to utilize Lagrange interpolation to re-encode the τ -sums y19:20,3 − z17:18,3 and y19:20,4 − z17:18,4
as they represent polynomials of degree strictly larger than one.
Final Round (τ = 3): The decoding procedure is as follows.
1) Interference cancellation: Utilize the decoded τ -sums from the set Q˜(1)j (U , 2) of Table VII–(b) to cancel the
side information, marked in red in Table VI, from the query sets Q(1)j (D, 3) for j ∈ {1, 2}. As a result we
obtain the desired symbols of the set Q˜(1)j (D, 3) shown in Table VII–(c).
2) Generate new symbols: This step is only required when nˆ − ⌊ nˆ
k˜
⌋
k˜ < k due to the construction of the
interference matrix in the proof of Lemma 5. In particular, the condition is equivalent to Γ < k. Using the
obtained symbols from the previous step, colored in Table VII for Q˜(1)j (D, 3) with blue, along with the side
information downloaded in the previous round in Q(1)j (U , 2), generate
⌊
nˆ
k˜
⌋
k˜− (n− k) = 1 new τ -sums with
identical indices to the τ -sums retrieved from the nonsystematic nodes. These newly generated symbols are
shown in Q˜(1)j (U , 3).
3) Obtain the desired symbols: Here, we reverse the order of operation of the previous rounds where we use
Lagrange interpolation first and then cancel the side information. First, utilize the information sets I˜1 =
{1, 3, 4} and I˜2 = {2, 3, 4} of C˜ to decode the τ -sums containing the desired function evaluation for j ∈
{1, 2}. As a result, we obtain x26,1 +y24,1− z22,1 and x25,2 +y23,2− z21,2. Next, cancel the side information
from the τ -sums directly obtained from Q(1)j (U , 2) for j ∈ {1, 2}. Finally, by the end of this round, we have
obtained the final kν(
(
µ−1
τ−1
)
κµ−τ (ν − κ)τ−1) = 6 symbols from the desired function evaluation X(1).
In summary, the total number of desired function evaluation symbols obtained from this decoding process is
kν
∑µ
τ=1
(
µ−1
τ−1
)
κµ−τ (ν − κ)τ−1 = kνµ = 54. ♦
Remark 1. The systematic scheme above reduces to the systematic PPC scheme presented in [2] if and only if
n− k˜ ≤ k. In particular, this happens if and only if the storage code rate k/n ≥ k/(k+ g(k− 1) + 1). Otherwise,
nˆ is smaller than n and the PPC rate becomes larger than the one for the systematic scheme in [2].
Remark 1 can be easily verified with the following argument. The two schemes are equivalent if and only if n = nˆ
and ν = k+ min{k, n− k˜} (see [2, Thm. 2]). Assume that n− k˜ ≤ k. Then, 1 ≤ ⌊n
k˜
⌋ ≤ ⌊1 + k
k˜
⌋ ≤ 2. If ⌊n
k˜
⌋
= 1,
then it follows directly from (29) and Lemma 6 that n = nˆ and ν = k + n− k˜ = k + min{k, n− k˜}. Otherwise,
if
⌊
n
k˜
⌋
= 2, then k = k˜, 3k > n ≥ 2k, and from (29), we have nˆ = k + k˜ = 2k. Since, by assumption, we have
n− k˜ ≤ k, it follows that n ≤ k + k˜ = 2k. Combining the two inequalities over n, specifically, 3k > n ≥ 2k and
n ≤ 2k, we conclude that n = 2k and it holds that n = nˆ. Now, from Lemma 6, ν = 2k = k + min{k, n − k˜},
and the equivalence of the two schemes follows. The “only-if” part follows in a similar manner. Finally, the lower
bound on the storage code rate follows directly from the condition n− k˜ ≤ k.
D. Achievable PPC Rate
Using Lemmas 4 and 5, the following theorem follows.
Theorem 6. Consider a DSS that uses an [n, k] RS code C to store f messages over n noncolluding databases using
systematic Lagrange encoding. Let µ ∈ [f : µ(f, g)] be the number of candidate polynomial functions evaluations
of degree at most g, including the f independent messages. Then, the PPC rate
RSPPC =

1
f Hmin if n ≤ g(k − 1) + 1,
k
nˆ (
ν−κ
κ )Hmin
1−
(
κ
ν
)min{µ,M(f,g)}−(min{µ,M(f,g)}−f)(1−κν )(κν )µ−1 otherwise (33)
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with κν =
k
nˆ−
⌊
nˆ
k˜
⌋
(k˜−k)
and nˆ as defined in (29), is achievable.
Proof: From (23) and by removing redundant τ -sums from the query sets according to Lemma 4, the achievable
PPC rate becomes
R
(a)
=
kνµHmin
nˆ
((
µ
1
)− (µ−f1 ))κµ + nˆ∑µτ=2 ρ(µ, τ)κµ−τ+1(ν − κ)τ−1
=
kνµHmin
nˆκ
[
fκµ−1 +
∑µ
τ=2 ρ(µ, τ)κ
µ−τ (ν − κ)τ−1
] , (34)
where (a) follows from the PPC rate in Definition 3, (23), and Lemma 4.
Now, we first consider the case where ν = κ and show that it is equivalent to n ≤ g(k − 1) + 1. Assume
that ν = κ = k. Then, for the first case of (32) it follows that k˜ = n. For the second and third cases of (32),
to obtain ν = k, we must have
⌊
n
k˜
⌋
= 1 or
⌊
n
k˜
⌋
= 0, respectively, which violates the condition of the second
case and is never true for the third case. Since, by Proposition 1, k˜ = min{g(k − 1) + 1, n} = n, it follows that
n ≤ g(k − 1) + 1. Conversely, if n ≤ g(k − 1) + 1, then k˜ = min{g(k − 1) + 1, n} = n, and it follows from (32)
(the first case) that ν = κ. Hence, in summary, we have shown that ν = κ is equivalent to n ≤ g(k− 1) + 1. As a
result, for n ≤ g(k − 1) + 1, it follows directly from (34) that R = knˆf Hmin. Moreover, it can be seen in this case
that the proposed systematic PPC scheme reduces to the trivial scheme for which all the f independent files are
downloaded and the desired function evaluation is performed offline. However, similar to the general PPC scheme,
the proposed systematic PPC scheme requires an unnecessarily high redundancy to decode the f files, i.e., k˜ = nˆ
instead of k˜ = k. As a result, for the case of n ≤ g(k − 1) + 1, we again opt out of any other achievable scheme
and achieve the PPC rate 1f Hmin by simply downloading all f files and performing the desired function evaluation
offline.
On the other hand, if ν > κ, or equivalently, n > g(k − 1) + 1, then from (34) we have
R
(b)
=
kHmin
nˆκ
[
fκµ−1
νµ
+
1
νµ(ν − κ)
µ∑
τ=2
ρ(µ, τ)κµ−τ (ν − κ)τ
]−1
=
k(ν − κ)Hmin
nˆκ
[
f(ν − κ)
ν
(κ
ν
)µ−1
+
1
νµ
µ∑
τ=2
ρ(µ, τ)κµ−τ (ν − κ)τ
]−1
...
(c)
=
k
nˆ(
ν−κ
κ )Hmin
1− (κν )min{µ,M(f,g)} − (min{µ,M(f, g)} − f)(1− κν )(κν )µ−1 ,
where (b) follows since ν > k and (c) results from following similar steps as in the proof of the achievable PPC
rate of Theorem 5 in Section VII-E.
Corollary 2. Consider a DSS that uses an [n, k] RS code C to store f messages over n noncolluding databases
using systematic Lagrange encoding. Let µ ∈ [f : µ(f, g)] be the number of candidate polynomial functions
evaluations of degree at most g, including the f independent messages. Then, the PPC rate
RSPPC,∞ =

1
n
(
max{n− g(k − 1)− 1, 0})Hmin if ⌊nk˜ ⌋ = 1 and n− ⌊nk˜ ⌋k˜ < k,
1
nˆ
(⌊
n
g(k−1)+1
⌋
k − k)Hmin if ⌊nk˜ ⌋ > 1 and n− ⌊ ng(k−1)+1⌋(g(k − 1) + 1) < k,
1
nˆ
(b ng(k−1)+1⌋k)Hmin if ⌊nk˜ ⌋ ≥ 1 and n− ⌊ ng(k−1)+1⌋(g(k − 1) + 1) ≥ k,
(35)
with nˆ as defined in (29), is asymptotically achievable for f →∞.
Proof: If n ≤ g(k − 1) + 1, then it follows from (33) that the PPC rate approaches zero as f →∞, which is
in accordance with (35) (first case, since
⌊
n
k˜
⌋
= 1 and n − ⌊n
k˜
⌋
k˜ = 0 < k). Otherwise, if n > g(k − 1) + 1, the
result follows directly from (33) by taking the limit f → ∞ and using (32) and the fact (see Proposition 1) that
k˜ = min{g(k − 1) + 1, n} = g(k − 1) + 1.
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Fig. 3: Achievable PMC rates as a function of the number of messages f for n = 7, k = 2, and g = 2.
Note that when n− k˜ ≤ k, the asymptotic PPC rate in (35) is equal to the rate of the systematic scheme from [21,
Thm. 3], [22] when Hmin = 1. This difference is due to the simplified rate definition used in [21], [22]. However,
for the case when n− k˜ > k, with the simplified rate definition, i.e., for Hmin = 1, the asymptotic PPC rate in (35)
is larger compared to the PPC rate of the systematic scheme from [21, Thm. 3], [22]. See also Remark 1.
IX. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In Fig. 3a, we compare the PMC rates of Theorems 5 and 6 to those of the schemes from [21], [22] as well as the
converse bound from Theorem 2 (using the exact information-theoretic rate from Definition 3) for n = 7, k = 2,
g = 2, and computations over F3. The scheme from Theorem 5 shows improved performance for a low number of
messages f , while the systematic scheme from Theorem 6 shows improved performance for all values of f , even
in the asymptotic case of f → ∞. As the number of messages f grows, the curve from Theorem 5 converges to
the rate from [22], as can be seen from Corollary 1, while the asymptotic performance of the systematic scheme
follows from Corollary 2 (second case). The converse bound from Theorem 2 shows a relatively large gap for all
values of f . For comparison, we also plot in Fig. 3b the PMC rate when parallel monomials are excluded from the
candidate function set. As for the case when parallel monomials are included we observe improved performance
for the systematic scheme from Theorem 6 for all values of f .
In Fig. 4, we compare the PMC rates of Theorems 5 and 6 and those of the schemes from [21], [22] for various
values of the storage code rate α = k/n, fixed k, g = 2, µ = M(f, 2), f = 2 for Fig. 4a, and f = 10 for
Fig. 4b. For a small number of files (f = 2), the proposed schemes show improved performance for all code
rates, while for a relatively large number of files (f = 10), the systematic scheme from Theorem 6 shows improved
performance up to some code rate (see Remark 1). Observe that when neglecting the computational cost at the user,
the trivial scheme which downloads all the f files and computes the desired function evaluation offline outperforms
all considered PPC schemes when the code rate is above some threshold that depends on both f and g. For f = 10
the code rate needs to be close to 1/2 for the trivial scheme to be the best. Note that the curve for the systematic
scheme follows a staircase in which there are k˜ points on each horizontal line of the staircase. This follows directly
from the term
⌊
n
k˜
⌋
in the definition of nˆ in (29).
X. CONCLUSION
We have provided the capacity of PLC from coded DSSs, where data is encoded and stored using an arbitrary
linear code from the class of MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes. Interestingly, the capacity of PLC is equal to the
corresponding MDS-PIR capacity. Thus, privately retrieving arbitrary linear combinations of the stored messages
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(b) For f = 10 and k = 20.
Fig. 4: PMC rates as a function of the storage code rate α = k/n for fixed f , k, g = 2, and µ = M(f, 2). For the
sake of simplicity, we assume Hmin = 1.
does not incur any overhead in rate compared to retrieving a single message from the databases. For the PPC
problem, we have presented two PPC schemes for RS-coded DSSs with Lagrange encoding showing improved
computation rates compared to the best known PPC schemes from the literature when the number of messages is
small. Asymptotically, as the number of messages tends to infinity, the rate of our RS-coded nonsystematic PPC
scheme approaches the rate of the best known nonsystematic PPC scheme. However, for systematically RS-coded
DSSs, our scheme significantly outperforms all known PPC schemes up to some specific storage code rate that
depends on the maximum degree of the candidate polynomials. Finally, a general converse bound on the PPC rate
was derived and compared to the achievable rates of the proposed schemes.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Since each linear function X(v) =
(
X
(v)
1 , . . . , X
(v)
L
)
, v ∈ [µ], contains L independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) symbols, it is clear that ∀ l ∈ [L],
H
(
X(1), . . . ,X(µ)
)
= LH
(
X
(1)
l , . . . , X
(µ)
l
)
,
H
(
W(1), . . . ,W(f)
)
= LH
(
W
(1)
l , . . . ,W
(f)
l
)
.
Let J , {j1, . . . , jh} for some h ∈ [r]. We have
Pr
[
X
(i1)
l , . . . , X
(ih)
l
]
=
∑
wJ
c
l
Pr
[
WJ
c
l = w
J c
l
]
· Pr
[
X
(i1)
l , . . . , X
(ih)
l
∣∣∣WJ cl = wJ cl ]
=
∑
wJ
c
l
Pr
[
WJ
c
l = w
J c
l
]
· Pr
[
W
(j1)
l , . . . ,W
(jh)
l
∣∣∣WJ cl = wJ cl ] (36)
=
∑
wHc
Pr
[
WJ
c
l = w
J c
l
](1
q
)h
=
(1
q
)h
, (37)
where (36) follows from the fact that there is a linear transformation between X(i1)l , . . . , X
(ih)
l and
W
(j1)
l , . . . ,W
(jh)
l , and (37) holds since W
(j1)
l , . . . ,W
(jh)
l are i.i.d. over Fq. Hence, H
(
X
(i1)
l , . . . , X
(ih)
l
)
= h
(in q-ary units), which completes the proof.
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